THE FORTNIGHTLY

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THE WAR AND THE YOUNG OFFENDER

BY JOHN A. F. WATSON

IF there is one guiding principle for magistrates and others who are concerned with delinquent children, it is this: that far more important than a child's offence are the conditions which give rise to it.

Two boys—let us call them Tom and Peter—are found guilty of stealing from the ruins of a bombed warehouse: a common enough offence at the present time. They are much the same to look at. They live in the same district. They are both fourteen. Neither boy has ever been in trouble before. Yet not infrequently the enquiries made by the juvenile court reveal an amazing contrast in their social and moral background.

Tom's home is in a slum court and consists of three rooms up a dark and evil-smelling staircase. There he lives with his parents, an elder sister of sixteen, and three small brothers under conditions of nauseating squalor. His father is a shiftless drunken creature who is rarely in work, but frequently in prison. During the intervals between one sentence and the next he spends most of his time and all the money he can lay hands on at the local pub. Minnie, the eldest girl, earns a large part of the family income in a munition factory. Their mother, an unkempt and slatternly woman, " minds " the home, the comfort and cleanliness of which she has long since ceased to care about. Tom himself is a van boy—his third job since leaving school last Easter. In the evenings, as he is not wanted indoors and belongs to no club, you will find him in the street. At night he sleeps on the kitchen sofa under a pile of old coats.

Now meet Peter. An only child, he comes from an excellent home. His father, a postman of many years' standing, has apprenticed him to a printer, and both he and his wife are horrified that their son should steal. For some time they have been worried about the kind of friends Peter has been making, especially since the evening institute was bombed and shut. They have already punished him severely and beg the court to give him another chance.

Could anything be more futile than to deal with these two boys in the same way—just because it happens that both have committed the same offence? For Peter, who is thoroughly ashamed of himself, a few plain words will meet the case, brought home to him perhaps by some minor penalty such as the payment of a few shillings out of his pocket money by way of "costs." But for Tom, who confronts the court with an air of defiance and whose mother is voluble in her excuses on his behalf, more drastic treatment is called for. The court decides to transfer him from his present surroundings to lodgings or to a hostel, if not to an approved school, where they may yet succeed in making him a decent citizen. We are no longer content to "let the punishment fit the crime." We are concerned with something vastly more important—to make the treatment fit the criminal.

Proof of the overwhelming influence of a child's surroundings upon his behaviour—if indeed proof were needed—is to be found in the juvenile courts at the present time. For under the abnormal conditions resulting from the war there has been a serious increase in juvenile crime, which is said to have risen by 30 per cent. as compared with the pre-war period. This deplorable happening is not due to any fundamental difference in the children themselves. Boys and girls in war-time are intrinsically no more wicked than in time of peace. It is simply that a variety of unusual factors, both social and psychological, are affecting their outlook and influencing their conduct: the disruption of homes by evacuation; the interference with such normal family life as remains by air raids; lack of parental control due to the absence of fathers on active service; the breakdown of the educational system; the excessive wages being paid to boys and girls in their 'teens; the closing of clubs and evening institutes; last, but not least, the very atmosphere of war itself, which stimulates that spirit of mischief which is inherent in young people.

Consider, first, the results of evacuation. Designed to spare our children the horrors of total warfare it was unquestionably justified, and by its means thousands of boys and girls have been saved from death or mutilation. But let no one think that this has been accomplished without an appalling list of casualties of another kind. I refer to the *mental* and *moral* casualties, from the effects of which the country will suffer for at least a generation. Some people hoped that this great exodus of Youth would herald a social revolution of considerable magnitude. In fact, it has resulted in considerable

chaos. But even if the responsible authorities had performed their duties so efficiently that the whole scheme had gone through without a hitch, there remains one fundamental difficulty which the most efficient organization would have been at pains to overcome. For to children there is one thing even more important than fresh air, or warm beds, or nourishing food. That is the peace of mind born of family life in a happy home.

Appearances are so often deceptive where children are concerned. Too frequently the child who seems happy enough in the foster-home, if at times a trifle home-sick, is in fact suffering an emotional strain which may have all kinds of serious consequences. It is not merely that he is concerned for his parents' safety—which is natural enough since he knows that they are still living in a place considered too dangerous for him. It is that so many evacuated children develop a deep-seated anxiety as to whether their parents, who agreed to their exile, still love them and want them back. Need I dwell on the close relationship between a child's happiness and his behaviour? Nowhere is this more strongly emphasized than in the juvenile court, where the vast majority of young offenders are found to come from broken and disrupted homes. Evacuation has broken up thousands of happily adjusted families and is thus the indirect cause of much delinquency.

Now consider the combined effect upon so many children of the emotional upheaval caused by evacuation, with the educational breakdown which followed in its wake. It is true that most of these who went to the country had some form of teaching, although generally on a half-time basis. But of those who stayed behind, or trickled back from the reception areas, many received no schooling at all. Then at the age of 14 they found that jobs were theirs for the asking, mostly in blind-alley occupations and all of them overpaid. Could anything be more demoralizing?

Albert, for example, was evacuated at the beginning of the war. He came from a decent working-class home in South East London, and although his father was dead he had a grown-up brother who kept him well in hand. His brother joined the R.A.F., his small sister was evacuated somewhere else with her school, his mother got a job on munitions. Thus the home was completely disrupted. Albert was unhappy in the country and behaved very badly. When on his fourteenth birthday in March, 1940, he returned to London, everyone was thankful to see the last of him.

He secured his first job without difficulty—as errand boy in a bootshop. He kept it exactly a fortnight. And when he appeared in the juvenile court in January, 1941, pleading guilty to the theft of a bicycle from a bombed garage, the court was supplied with a record of his employment:—

(1) *Bootshop:* 2 weeks. Quarrelled with the other boy and walked out.
(2) *Electric Light Co.:* 5 weeks. Left, because he tried to tell the manager what hours he intended to work. Also there was trouble over a shilling he was supposed to have been paid by a customer.
(3) *Engineers:* 5½ weeks. Dismissed, because he was saucy and would not pay attention to his work.
(4) *Grocers:* 2 weeks. Dismissed, because of doubt about his honesty.
(5) *Cleaners:* 1 day. Left, because the cycle was too heavy.
(6) *Tin Factory:* 3 weeks. Left, because he wanted more money.
(7) *Laundry:* 5 weeks. Dismissed, because he was found to be unsuitable and played truant on Saturdays.
(8) *Rag Merchants:* 2 weeks. Dismissed, because he was caught taking away some goods.
(9) *Leather-shop:* 1 week. Left, because he did not like it.
(10) *Furnishers:* 2 days. Left, because he did not like it.

It will be seen that during a period of approximately 39 weeks he was in employment for only 26. For a third of the time he was out of work and doing nothing. Yet Albert is not wholly a bad boy. On the contrary, he has much good in him. What he needs—and is now receiving in an approved school—are the discipline and training which, due to circumstances almost entirely arising from the war, were denied to him at a highly impressionable stage of his development.

Apart from the ease with which boys can find jobs in wartime, there is an additional evil in the excessive wages which they are paid as a result of the shortage of juvenile labour—especially in the contracting industry. To-day, boys in their early 'teens are often able to make £3, £4 or even £5 a week—in many cases more than their own fathers, now serving with the armed forces, have ever made in their lives. Indeed, a few months ago, I had to deal in my court with a boy of 14 who was receiving—I will not say earning—the preposterous wage of £6 5s. 0d. a week for fixing slates on shattered roofs.

It is not unnatural that boys who are apprenticed at a few shillings a week should throw up their training in favour of jobs where they can count the contents of their pay packets in pounds. It is happening every day, for the temptation is so great as to be almost irresistible. What *is* wrong is that the employers of labour—and behind them the biggest employer

of all, the State—should put such temptation in their way. What, one wonders, are the feelings of their fathers and their brothers who are fighting for their country, when they see these striplings gaining so huge a reward for so insignificant an effort? And of what value to an industrial nation will be a generation of unskilled labourers—unskilled because of this wholesale breaking of apprenticeships in favour of blind-alley occupations? On a boy's character the effect is disastrous. Few of them have anything to show for the wages they receive; for the most part they are squandered on gambling and on drink, in the cinema and the fun-fair, or lavished on girls of the most undesirable type. So high do they pitch their standard of living that when they lose their jobs—as frequently they do— they refuse every offer of employment which is less well-paid. In the meantime they steal.

This menace to the nation's youth is all the graver, coming as it does at a time when so many clubs and centres for young people have closed their doors. Some have been closed for lack of leaders; others have been closed because their premises have been requisitioned by some "competent" but singularly unimaginative, authority; still others have been demolished by bombs. Thus in many districts, at a time when there is a vital need for some means of healthy recreation for young people in their spare time, no such counter-attraction exists. The recent provision for the compulsory registration of children aged from 16 to 18, in order to ensure that they are employing their spare time to the best advantage, is a step in the right direction. So is the agreement said to have been reached for the payment of youths in the building trade on a wage-for-age scale. But both are over-due and neither goes far enough. It is just as important, if not *more* important, to supervise the recreation of children at the impressionable age of 14 and 15 as of those who are older; and until some form of wage-control is applied in *all* industries where young people are employed—at least until normal conditions return—the harm will continue and the statistics of juvenile crime will go on rising.

So far I have written of boys. Alas, it is to be feared that girls too are finding their way into the juvenile courts in increasing numbers—although less commonly on a criminal charge than on the ground that they are beyond their parents' control, or "in need of care or protection" because they are in moral danger. Here again the blame lies less with the girls themselves, than with the unnatural social conditions which

are so deplorable a by-product of modern warfare. The adolescent girl is notoriously passing through a difficult phase. Sex plays a far more self-conscious part in her mental make-up than in that of the average boy. The general atmosphere of unrest, the laxity of parental control, and a superabundance of young soldiers of romantic disposition conspire with the black-out and the communal life of the air-raid shelter to put temptations in her way. What easier to-day than for Mary "in one of her moods," smarting perhaps under some parental rebuke, to assert her independence by running away from home?

The procession of such girls through the juvenile court is one of the saddest features of the war. Most of them come from respectable families and have never previously been in trouble. Yet they are frequently brought before the court after being missing not merely for days, but for weeks. Jobs can be had for the asking. So can boy friends with money to burn. There is always the public air-raid shelter—if nowhere better—in which to sleep. When found they are sometimes pregnant, and nearly all are infected with venereal disease. Weak and stupid as they are, thoughtless of all the misery they cause to their parents, yet one could scarcely describe them as wicked. For the most part they are just the pathetic victims of adverse circumstances. *Les enfants sont ce qu'on les fait.*

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It is surely obvious that the treatment of these young people by the juvenile court *must* be constructive. It is not enough that it shall be merely punitive. And although deterrence may be an important factor in punishment, no order by the magistrates should contain any element of retribution—which is merely a polite word for revenge. Indeed their attitude should be that of wise parents, who punish their child in order to prevent a repetition of his offence—not "to get back on him" for the consequences of his misbehaviour. Magistrates are not appointed to enable Society to get back on the offender.

Of the total number of children who appear each year before the juvenile courts of England and Wales, roughly half are dealt with by being placed on probation. That is to say they are sent home, or required to live for a time in lodgings or a hostel, under the supervision of a probation officer attached to the court. Probation officers are in no way connected with the police. They are highly trained social workers and the servants of the court. It is customary for women officers to

deal with girls and all boys under 14, and for male officers to supervise the older boys. They are remarkable people, these probation officers, of whose work it is impossible to speak too highly. Especially in war-time, when the problems they have to solve are vastly more complex than in time of peace, theirs is a vocation which calls for all that is best in men and women.

In these days of excessive wages the fine has become a more effective instrument in the correction of the young offender than in the past. Moreover, the payment of costs or damages to the prosecutor, introducing the salutary principle of restitution, may be ordered in addition to a probation order or to some other form of treatment.

But what, it may be asked, is the remedy when these methods have failed? What is to be done with the child or young person who has been fined and placed on probation—perhaps been made to live in lodgings or in a hostel—and who still offends? The answer is that in such circumstances the court should have no hesitation whatever in ordering long-term treatment—in the case of a child under 10 by committing him to the local authority, which may assume responsibility for his maintenance with foster-parents until he is 18; in the case of a boy or girl who is older, by committal to an approved school.

Approved schools are the lineal descendants of the old industrial schools and reformatories. Although subject to inspection by the Home Office, they are owned and managed by local authorities or voluntary organizations. They are graded according to various age-groups and the schools for the older children are equipped for technical instruction in various trades. To the casual visitor an approved school much resembles an ordinary boarding school, but there is the important difference that the approved-school child remains there all the year round except for a fortnight's holiday in the summer. The length of his detention does not rest with the court. Subject to a certain maximum period, calculated according to his age on admission, the date of his release depends upon his own industry and conduct. Thus the school managers, on the advice of their headmaster or headmistress, have power to release him at any time after the expiration of twelve months.

Generally speaking these schools do excellent work and, having regard to the material they have to deal with, the proportion of their successes is remarkable. It is therefore all the more to be regretted that at the present time, when our troubles are so serious, the capacity of the schools should be insufficient to meet the demand. At the end of 1941, according

to a statement made in Parliament, there were no less than 1300 children, already committed, awaiting vacancies in remand homes up and down the country. This is deplorable. It is to be hoped that the Home Office will do everything in its power to expedite the opening of new schools; for remand homes, which are designed for temporary detention only, are quite unsuitable for long-term treatment.

There are three other methods of treatment to which I must refer briefly. The first is imprisonment, which, though never ordered in the case of offenders so young as 14, is still a legal punishment for children as soon as they have reached that age. Prison is in every sense a hopeless place for boys and girls. The provisions of the Criminal Justice Bill, which sought virtually to abolish imprisonment for offenders under 21 and was unfortunately dropped at the outbreak of war, are long overdue.

The second is Borstal. In no sense a prison, it is a system of re-education and training for more depraved offenders between 16 and 23. As however the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts ceases at the seventeenth birthday, the proportion of cases recommended by such courts for Borstal treatment is relatively small.

Lastly I come to the birch, the use of which as a means of treatment has been abandoned by all the more progressive and enlightened courts. I have no intention of entering here upon a discussion of so controversial a subject except to say this: that the decision of the Departmental Committee on Corporal Punishment was based, not on sentimentality, but on common sense. After hearing the whole of the evidence the Committee came to the unanimous conclusion that the *judicial* whipping of children, both as a reformative factor and as a deterrent, had been proved to be ineffective and should therefore be abolished.

In these dark days when the youth of England is so beset with temptations, the responsibility of the juvenile court is indeed heavy. Thus I would end where I began, by repeating that the infliction of mere punishment according to the nature of the offence is not enough. The vital thing is the child's welfare. The task of the court is to find a remedy for his troubles.

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AUSTRALIA'S POLITICAL TREND

By Eric Baume

JOHN Curtin, Prime Minister of Australia, to-day is the pivot on which Australian contemporary politics is balanced. The one-time secretary of the Victorian Timber Workers' Union, far from being hamstrung by a bare majority in the Australian House of Representatives, has more power, by public support and acclaim, than the Menzies administration, the Fadden " rump " or, for that matter, the Nationalist (now United Australia Party) Country Party coalition when the Rt. Hon. S. M. Bruce, P.C., M.C., C.H., and Sir Earle Page, G.C.M.G. (both to-day in London) were in office before that defeat in 1928 which brought Messrs. Scullin and E. G. Theodore into power with a previous Labour Government.

It is no over-statement to claim that Mr. Curtin in the past month has become the most significant public figure in the British Pacific. To assess the augmenting of his political stature as well as the growing public expressions of Australian sentiment in this war it is necessary to review shortly the events since 1939 which have led to what is, in the opinion of many observers, Mr. Curtin's decision to demand the implementing of the Statute of Westminster.

Until his now almost sensationally regarded speech of December, the Statute had been something symbolic of the Imperial spirit, of the English (as apart from the Empire) delight in a banner hanging above a stall; but it had never been implemented, prosaically, realistically. The Dominions Office had no need to tempt Providence. With High Commissioners' cars, beflagged, outside Downing Street offices, direct demands—or suggestions—came only through secret if conventional channels. No untoward remark in public, no embarrassing suggestion in the press until *after* a decision, was ever anticipated by Whitehall. No Prime Minister—not even the Rt. Hon. Peter Fraser or his predecessor the late Rt. Hon. Michael Joseph Savage, though their Finance Minister had been embarrassed by the City of London in pre-war days —would have ignored formal channels of Dominions representation.

But the Rt. Hon. John Curtin, skilled in harsh industrial disputes, decided on other, less traditional methods. By his recent action I for one am convinced he has forced, for the better, changes of British war plans as well as of British strategy and conception affecting what, for simplicity's sake, may be called the "Outer Empire." Added significance is given his decision by the wording of the Indian Congress message to Britain of January 4th. His policy of a direct and uncompromising "crisis approach" direct to the British Prime Minister will alter the concept of the Statute of Westminster as surely as the idealistic Atlantic Charter will one day become a rationalized document, retaining its beauty but adding to itself the means of physical accomplishment as well as virtuous expression.

Mr. Curtin's bluntness is a key to the internal politics of Australia. The Commonwealth is a country keenly, vehemently political in its Federal sphere at Canberra and its State legislative systems in New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, West Australia and Tasmania. The almost gruff realism of Australian Labour, more vocal in foreign affairs than the equally forceful internal policy of New Zealand Labour, I believe will have an effect on the post-war Empire—the British Commonwealth of Nations—which official England so far cannot, perhaps will not understand.

That is why Mr. Curtin's recent speeches should be reviewed dispassionately. There has been too much "professional" political propaganda about them, both in Britain and in Australia. Asperity expressed must have been welcomed *mit grossem vergneugen* by Dr. Dietrich's Press-Bureau in Berlin. Even Mr. Menzies' effusion about Australian "loyalty" was in my opinion as gratuitously unnecessary as Sir Keith Murdoch's plea to Australians to "Trust Britain." Neither, fundamentally, was needed. Party politics must not be considered if Mr. Curtin's speeches are to be dissected for the Empire's sake—though to his political opponents in Australia and in Britain they have produced a violent political urticaria.

Before discussing Mr. Curtin's speeches and their implications, I am indebted to a London staff colleague, Mr. Charles Henry Bateson, formerly Principal Information Officer with the Australian Government, for a vivid pen-picture of the Prime Minister himself—a picture which will establish his character and enable people in Britain to assess from that character the importance or otherwise of his actions. Mr. Bateson writes:

Doubtless many people have pictured 'Jack' Curtin, since his recent pronunciamento, as a big, broad-shouldered, truculent individual, loud-voiced and aggressive. Nothing could be further from the truth. Although his well-knit figure still bears the unmistakable traces of the former athlete, Curtin is slight, bespectacled, rather stooped, and his voice is quiet and subdued. At first glance you might pass him by as a nonentity, mentally classifying him as a retiring scholar or an undistinguished minor official. It is only later that you become aware of a curiously latent dynamic quality within him. It is impossible to appreciate Curtin's position in Australian politics, and now his position in Empire politics, without knowing and understanding the man himself; for Curtin's influence upon Australia and Australian politics, if less spectacular, has been as great as the influence of Churchill upon the British Empire, or Roosevelt upon the Americas. Until the tempering test of war revealed his peculiar gifts, Curtin had had a mediocre career. He was born in Victoria in 1885, and, educated at State schools, did not go to University. He was 26 when he became secretary of a timber workers' union, and 32 when he was appointed editor of a labour weekly in Western Australia. He retained that position until his entry into Federal politics in 1928, but was defeated at the general elections three years later. In 1934 he re-entered the Federal House of Representatives, and the following year succeeded the former Prime Minister, 'Jim' Scullin, as leader of the Australian Labour Party. Only by a narrow majority did he retain his seat at the latest general elections in September, 1940. He has always been recognized as a competent labour journalist, with a flair for news. He has written numerous booklets and pamphlets expounding Labour's principles and policy.

When war broke out there were many critics, particularly in the Labour movement, who contended that Curtin was an unsuitable and unsatisfactory wartime Labour leader. His qualities of sincerity, fearlessness and genuine kindliness were admitted, and it was recognized that, on occasions, he was a powerful orator, one of the few outstanding speakers on either side of the Federal House. But the majority of Labour politicians and Labour supporters regarded this modest, rather shy man as being too weak and insufficiently aggressive, too interested in social reforms and social services, to lead the Labour Party successfully through the strains and stresses of war. He was, frankly and unashamedly a moderate, whereas a large section of the Labour movement was, just as frankly, more extreme. This militant industrial section, critical of Britain's political leadership under Baldwin and Chamberlain, had its headquarters in New South Wales, where Labour has always been more extremist in outlook than elsewhere in the Commonwealth. Perhaps that criticism was justified by events.

It is essential, for a proper appreciation of Curtin's qualities, and for a just assessment of subsequent events, that these facts should be noted. On the outbreak of war the Labour Party was opposed to the despatch of Australian troops abroad, at least until her home defences, particularly her air strength, had been built up to a stage at which she could regard herself as impregnable to invasion—prophetic view indeed. A considerable section of the movement, though here opinion was less unanimous, was sternly opposed to close and intimate

co-operation with the existing Government, and maintained that Labour could best serve the National interest by fulfilling the rôle of a critical opposition. Events, particularly Dunkirk and the fall of France, forced upon the Labour Party changes of major policy. Ultimately it withdrew its opposition to Australian volunteer forces serving abroad.

It was unquestionably Curtin's patience and quiet tact which enabled the Labour Party, without any loss of prestige and without any split within its own ranks, to weather these days of critical change. He ruled the caucas, the final arbiter in Labour politics, without seeming to rule it. A more violent, a more aggressive leader would have failed Curtin succeeded because all knew that he was sincere and honest, a man whose whole life had been devoted to the furtherance of Labour's aims and whose very soul was wrapped up in the Labour movement. He was trusted and respected, and it was this trust and respect, coupled with his sound political judgment and unfailing tact, which enabled him to induce his party to co-operate closely with the Government in its war measures through the War Advisory Council, while rejecting overtures for a National Government and remaining a still critical Opposition. But the measure of his achievement was not then recognized generally. The public regarded his leadership as weak and vacillating. This feeling was revealed significantly when he was almost defeated for the seat which he had held for seven years.

The Australian general elections multiplied Curtin's difficulties. Labour's forces, both in the House and in the Senate, were substantially increased, and many of the new members belonged to the militant New South Wales group. After each general election, the Labour Party's office-holders are elected by the caucus, and on the eve of its pre-sessional meeting there was talk of open revolt among many of its members, who demanded openly a new leader. But Curtin was elected to the leadership without opposition, and his supporters received the other executive posts. That he was still leader, not merely in name, but in actual fact, he showed again later, when at a long and stormy caucus meeting the militants demanded that the Labour Party should challenge the Government on the floor of the House and, with the support of certain independents, seize office. Curtin strenuously opposed that move. He carried the caucus with him, as he did again when the extremists essayed a second trial of strength. It was not that Curtin shirked the responsibilities of the Prime Ministership. He did not regard his party as being less fitted to govern than the coalition of the United Australia and Country Parties. But he did not deem the time ripe politically for Labour to seek office.

Where lies the quiet, determined strength of this man who has ruled Labour so ably during these months of storms and stresses and who to-day speaks to the Empire and the world fearlessly and bluntly? Perhaps the best answer is to be found in the experience of two American journalists, Messrs. Waymack and Binder, who visited Australia early last year. They talked with all Australia's political leaders and, in crisp, American style, put each through a rigorous cross-examination. Curtin they did not meet in person, since he was in West Australia at the time. But a special line was cleared so that they might interview him over the telephone. In rapid succession they asked him question after question, dealing with every conceiv-

able subject connected with Australia, her resources, her economic conditions, her industries, her policy in relation to the war; and, leaping nimbly from one subject to another, Curtin replied to each question informatively and intelligently. When the two Americans were leaving for home, they declared that no Australian had impressed them so favourably or had helped them so materially as Curtin, the one man they had not met in person.

Curtin is blunt, plain-speaking, essentially a realist; a man of infinite patience, keen political judgment, skilful and tactful in the handling of men; a man not brilliant, not scholarly, but well read and well informed, kindly and with a genuine sympathy for the "have-not." He lacks the magnetism and the breadth of vision of a Churchill or a Roosevelt. But he is sincere, honest, a hard, conscientious worker. And he is a journalist who knows unerringly how to arrest the attention of his listeners or his readers.

Thus concludes Mr. Bateson.

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After Mr. Curtin's first speech, in which he intimated that Australia would deal direct with Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Curtin was accused immediately of wishing to cut the painter between Australia and Britain. This, of course, was ludicrously untrue. There was little mention in England of two attacks upon Australia's methods and conduct of the war by *The Economist*, which were worded in such a way as to irritate not only the Prime Minister but many other Australians. These attacks may have been justifiable from *The Economist's* point of view, but the tone of them merited a sharp answer from Australia, irrespective of politics. This answer was given. When Mr. Curtin said that Australia looked to America in the Pacific, he was anticipating by a week or so the Allied declaration arrived at by Messrs. Churchill and Roosevelt, as well as the other Allies fighting the Axis. He was not asserting that Australia should sever traditional ties with Britain. Nothing could have been further from his mind, or the mind of the Australian Labour Party, as a Government, or the minds of the Australian people.

What is not realized in England is that for many years there has been in Australia a strong society known as Anglo-American Co-operation, which has worked indefatigably to produce better relations and closer co-operation between the two Pacific countries. This is no different, nor has it been in concept, from organizations in this country, one notable being that of Professor George Catlin for Anglo-Saxon Fellowship. Neither group could be accused of having been organizations comparable with those instituted by the Nazis in Danzig, or in the Sudetenland. Australia is British; Mr. Curtin says:

"More Empire-minded than the British War Cabinet." So it will remain.

A fiery reaction in certain quarters in Britain was fanned by well-meaning Australians. The *Daily Sketch* was the first to spring to the attack, and within a day Sir Keith Murdoch, a prominent Australian Newspaper proprietor, here on business, published in the *Daily Mail* an article appealing to Australia to "trust Britain." The fact that Australia did trust Britain and had trusted Britain for almost 160 years was not taken into account. The *Sydney Morning Herald* also attacked the Prime Minister for his choice of words, and within 48 hours the controversy had become, from the Australian point of view, parochially political, though many of the opposition supported Mr. Curtin. The moment it reached that stage it was obvious to observers who understood Australian politics that the Prime Minister's further statement of Australia's loyalty was made lest relations between Britain and Australia should deteriorate because of earnest, sincere, but at this particular stage rather thoughtless polemists.

What Mr. Curtin had done, apart from the words complained of, was simple. As Prime Minister of a great Pacific country he felt himself entitled to express the opinion of his Ministers and of himself that the war in the Pacific was not a subsidiary portion of the war in the West. There may be in Britain considerable sections of opinion who would oppose this view, who would most sincerely say that should Britain go under, the Empire had gone. That view would find respect among Australians but it would not silence their expressions.

The later reverses in Malaya, leaving out of the question the primary blows to American possessions, continued to strengthen Mr. Curtin's hand and his viewpoint. Leading Australian newspapers backed him up more vehemently than he had expressed himself. The *Sydney Daily Telegraph*, the *Sydney Daily Mirror*, the *Sydney Sun*, the *Melbourne Herald* (Sir Keith Murdoch's own paper), the *Melbourne Argus*, all vehicles of balanced opinion, were unanimous in demanding that Australia's voice be heard more in the conduct of the war, which was even at that time only a few hundred miles from her shores, for Koepang, 550 miles across the Timor Sea, is the beginning of the Dutch East Indies, and if they fall the Australian continent is open for invasion by land, by air, by sea. Hence the Dutch-Australian occupation of Timor.

It was not Mr. Curtin who complained in so many words of delays and traditionalism in both the Foreign Office and the

Dominions Office, though he implied it. It was the Australian newspapers who claimed, rightly in the opinion of many Australians, that the views of Australia had often been neglected by the Dominions Office system, because no High Commissioner had either the status or the right to force an issue. It may be said with equal justification that the High Commissioners have powers, under instruction from their Governments, and that the Dominions Office system had worked well and adequately for many years.

I think one should consider the abnormality of the times rather than the routine. War had come to the Pacific. Australia, eager to help, felt and expressed itself through its Prime Minister that there had been bungling incompetency and inefficiency, in the East as well as in the West. Australia was prepared to accept responsibility, and to take blame, provided she had the right to join in making vital decisions. Surely then the words of her Prime Minister were to be taken, not from the viewpoint that he may have used, as one critic said, an unhappy phrase, but that his mission was to speed up co-ordination of the Pacific defences even though that speeding-up had to be achieved by unconventional means.

To carping critics who continue to suggest that Mr. Curtin as a "secessionist," the answer is clear. There is no "Secession from Britain" movement in Australia, nor has there ever been one. The vapourings of an infinitesimal number of cranks, of whom there are similar types in, say, the Scottish National movement, cannot be regarded in any way as the voice of the Nation. How could Australia secede from itself? Yet that is what would be the position should she break from the British Empire. The Empire to-day is no single unit. England realizes the truth of that statement, judging from the conversations I have had here during the past two and a half years.

Another criticism of Mr. Curtin has been that he leads a violently Red party, revolutionary, irreconcilable. One cannot describe thus the Australian Labour Party. In the worst days of the J. T. Lang régime in New South Wales, when Captain de Groot cut the ribbon of the Sydney Harbour Bridge, having trotted uninvited with a Cavalry Guard of Honour; when Captain Eric Campbell formed the neo-Fascist New Guard; when Lang himself and his vivid Government was preparing such an assault on private enterprise as no British country has ever imagined, there was no question about Australia's loyalty to the Crown, with which she was, as she is,

one and indivisible. She has ever the spirit and the tradition of her forefathers. It is to be remembered that she, above all other countries of the Empire, has the highest proportion of British stock since the days of the First Fleet in 1788.

The trend in Australian Labour politics has never moved towards separatism. In a world in which sensations and the man-biting-dog news item had so much effect on the public since the end of the last war, it was only to be expected that movements such as West Australian Secession, which planned to break away from the Commonwealth, should have had undue prominence. That was a political squib. Perhaps it had some slight justification for having flared, because even Loan Councils can appear unjust at times.

The Australian Labour Party, in control in Australia to-day, should be remembered in Britain as the first to refuse Communists the right of membership when they were attempting to sabotage, generally, industrial effort. The Labour Party knew them for what they were, without reference to the Soviets. They were the descendants of the I.W.W. and the "Red Feds" of New Zealand. As such they were pledged to a policy of anarchy and destruction, which the Labour Party in earlier days smashed. The Party Mr. Curtin controls to-day, as well as the Labour Governments in Queensland, New South Wales and Tasmania, is not as Left Wing as most sections of the rank and file of British Parliamentary Labour. Australia's Labour problems have been concerned mainly with social legislation, with industrial unionism, and with the maintenance, linked closely with fiscal policy, of a high standard of living which has become part and parcel of the Australian scheme and bids fair to become one of the models for all the world when this war ends.

The varied avocations of members of State Governments, as well as of the Federal Government, again show the sound basis of personnel, separated entirely from visionaries and revolutionaries, on which the Australian Labour Party stands. For example, the Premier of New South Wales, Mr. W. J. McKell, now a lawyer, was once a boilermaker. In a recent speech (November) he said he regarded the press and its freedom as one of the most democratic of institutions. From that statement it should not be difficult to realize in England that the frank expressions about Australia's position in the Pacific, made after Mr. Curtin's speech, are in line with the forthright attitude of Australian newspapers, far less conciliatory than here. The Federal Treasurer, Mr. J. B. Chifley, who gave his

war-time Budget in November, was a worker on the New South Wales railway. The Minister for Customs, Senator Keane, was General Secretary of the Australian Railways Union when he entered the Senate in 1938.

Prominent in the newspaper columns of Australia last month were such items as expressions of opinion by Labour politicians that wartime promises to service men should be made legal and binding; that employment guarantee to returned service men by their former employers must be permanent, and that full allowances of adequate size should be continued to wives and children of those who lost their lives and will lose their lives during the war. The *Sydney Daily Mirror* recently (in a Trades Unionist country!) praised General Blamey for his frank statement that the comparison between the pay of soldiers and munitions workers was an outrage and was "war on the cheap." This newspaper, apparently with the support of the Government on the point, said: "A tax ear-marked for soldiers' higher pay would be gladly met, no matter how many millions of pounds a year it involved."

Added to this is a feeling in Australia, with the Government as well as the people, that in order to bring the Empire more closely together, there should be an Empire Government and Cabinet drawn from the whole Empire and acting for the Empire as a whole. There is no particular anxiety to have this brought about in full during a war. But Mr. Curtin's insistence on close discussion before war decisions are made from London, is regarded generally by Australians as reasonable, and as an earnest of Australia's determination to assist in every possible way to bring down for ever the Nazi terror in Europe.

Another quotation from a Sydney evening paper of November 12 fits both Mr. Curtin's speeches and the present situation: "Between Britain's war and Hitler's war there has long been this apparent difference—that the Nazis framed programme and plan more decisively than did the British." In that paragraph also is seen the reasons actuating the Australian Government in its request for closer co-operation. Australian politics are not British politics. I think if we take that as the basis for thought about Australian moves there will be no more misunderstanding. It is no more reasonable for English opinion to demand from Australia a National Government when Australian politics do not run that way, than it would be for Australian people to demand that the present Parliamentary truce in England be ended forthwith.

It is no use for Mr. Menzies, for British consumption, to urge a National Government, though he has a right so to do. He cannot alter, out of office, the will of Australian politics, any more than he could when he was in office.

Australia's political trend, as I see it, will be towards a harsher waging of war, strict national discipline, and the maintenance of unbounded faith and affection for its ties with Britain. And although prophecy is a foolish thing, I will prophesy that the extreme Left Wing, as it is known here, will not dominate the affairs of the Australian people. The Australian Labour Party is too strong for such incursions. Mr. Curtin, I believe, if he lives, will be Prime Minister at the Peace. The general impression is that he, with his government, will lead the Australian people wisely and well. But you will find that the Australian Government will insist on stronger representation in Britain, on the basis that it becomes so easy for an Australian after years of residence to adopt an English outlook that special care must be taken to ensure that Australia's voice in London will be the real voice of Australia —harsh on occasions though it may sound to Whitehall ears. And it may speak with full Ministerial status.

One final point to remember—the Australian Labour Party to-day is, in all respects, identical with Australia's first Government, the Watson Labour Government, which laid the foundations of the Commonwealth after the federation of the States.

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THE OUTLOOK FOR JAPAN

By Sir John Pratt

FROM the moment that Japan emerged into the modern world in the middle of the 19th century she has aspired to be the dominant power in the Far East. The idea might well have seemed an idle dream for it was at this moment that the nations of the West, exulting in the overwhelming power placed in their hands by their conquest over the forces of nature, were extending their activities to Eastern Asia and, by a strange combination of circumstances, the Japanese, a virile, competent and warlike people, found themselves armed only with bows and arrows. Japan, however, has an invincible faith in the capacity of her people, in her destiny and in the divine mission of the Yamato race and, with a steady spirit of calculation, that would be admirable if it were not consistently devoted to material ends, she prepared and armed for the trial of strength that lay ahead. The measures that she took seemed to be obvious precautions to make herself secure against any possible aggression and it was not apparent to the world at large that she cherished in secret the mystical idea that it was the mission of the Japanese race to spread their rule over the neighbouring peoples of Asia. She was thus able to take the first steps towards carrying out this mission without exciting undue suspicion or alarm because they seemed to have been taken merely in self defence. The rapid advance of Russia to the Pacific was a real menace and Japan accordingly drove China out of Korea in order to deprive Russia of a possible base for attack. Similarly the war with Russia in 1904-5, though it opened like the present war with a sudden attack by Japanese naval forces, was regarded as resistance to aggression. After the defeat of Russia, however, the Japanese army was with difficulty restrained from annexing South Manchuria and the soldiers never understood the political reasons that made annexation at that time inadvisable and never forgave the politicians for their caution. It was not till the Great War in 1914 that the mask was pulled aside and the Western Powers learned with some astonishment that Japan proposed to seize

the golden opportunity to turn the whole of China into a vassal state. A little later the Russian Empire fell to pieces in the Bolshevik revolution and Japan made a determined effort to establish her dominion over Eastern Siberia as well as North Manchuria. She had, however, miscalculated the strength of the forces, spiritual rather than material, that were arrayed against her. These aggressive enterprises failed disastrously, the army was discredited and out of favour and Japan accordingly was willing to come to the Washington Conference of 1921-22 and subscribe to the Anglo-American plan for stabilizing peace in the Far East. The effect of the various measures agreed to at the Conference was to place Japan in an impregnable position in the Western Pacific and in return for the complete security thus assured to her Japan pledged her honour to abandon aggression against China and to join with Britain, America and other interested Powers in international collaboration for the political and economic reconstruction of China. Ten years later, in 1931, she broke this pledge, seized Manchuria and embarked upon the course of aggression which has culminated in open war on China, the plan to establish a Greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere and the treacherous attack upon Pearl Harbour, and the British Empire in the Far East on December 7, 1941.

The stage Japan had reached, about the year 1930, just before she embarked upon her present course, may serve as a convenient standpoint from which to "look before and after" and obtain a general view of the Far Eastern Scene in which this drama is being enacted. The population of Japan doubled in the 50 years prior to 1930 and is still rapidly increasing. Living conditions in the urban and industrial centres that have grown up since Japan became a manufacturing country do not favour large families. There are fewer marriages, the marriage age is later and new conceptions of marriage and family life are spreading among the people; but an abnormally large proportion of the population consists of persons of child bearing age and this makes it certain that between 1930 and 1960 there will be an addition of 15 to 20 millions to the population of Japan. Only one sixth of the area of Japan is cultivated and pressure of population has already led to excessive fragmentation of farm land. The land tenure system is essentially a system of small holders and two-thirds of the farmers occupy farms of less than 2½ acres in extent.

Rice is the staple crop and by immense and painstaking industry and an intensive system of agriculture Japan succeeds

in growing all but 5 per cent. of the food that she eats. Since the first decade of the 20th century there has been a notable rise in the standard of living but it is the urban classes who have reaped the benefit rather than the farmers and peasants. Japanese rice is produced at too high a cost, the law of diminishing returns has begun to operate and agricultural depression is endemic. The farmer has however been saved by silk. The production of raw silk in Japan trebled in volume between the years 1913 and 1928 and in the latter year Japan accounted for two-thirds of the world exports of silk. One half of Japan's total exports consisted of raw silk and nine-tenths of the Japanese exports of silk were sent to a single country, the United States of America. The value of the raw silk sent to America, £70 millions sterling, almost exactly balanced the value of the raw cotton imported from that country, and it was this sale of raw silk to America that enabled the Japanese farmer to eke out a living on his tiny holding.

Silk and cotton have always been the two chief mainstays of Japan's economy and it was this narrow basis of her foreign trade that was the greatest menace to the Japanese standard of living in 1930. Seventy per cent. of her total exports consisted of two commodities, silk and cotton, and seventy per cent. of her exports were sent to two countries, America and China. The American tariff of 60 to 90 per cent. on silk piece goods was an effective bar to the development of silk manufactures in Japan while the raw silk trade was at the mercy of vagaries of fashion. Similarly the cotton trade was at the mercy of gusts of political passion that might give rise to a boycott or a hostile tariff in China, and the progress of industrialization in other countries, particularly China and India, might at any moment threaten the Japanese industry. The diversification of Japanese industry was thus an urgent necessity, and in order to provide a basis for this diversification and for a wider range of foreign exports the essential first step was to build up heavy industries. Heavy industries are also the foundation of military and political power and the greatest obstacle to the realization of Japan's dream of the hegemony of Eastern Asia is her lack of the fuel and metal resources required for the establishment of heavy industries. This is the explanation of Japan's interest in Manchuria.

When Japan defeated Russia in 1905 she acquired by treaties with Russia and China the special position in South Manchuria that is so vividly described in the Report of the League of Nations Commission of 1932 commonly known as the Lytton

Report. The measure of control that she thus acquired in that region afforded a valuable outlet for the economic and industrial activities of her people. The country was developed by railways built with Japanese capital. The soya bean was introduced and by 1930 seven million acres were devoted to its cultivation and the imports of soya bean and bean cake played almost as important a part in Japan's economy as rice itself. It is however the supplies of Manchurian fuel and metal which Japan regards as indispensable. Even before 1931 her plan was to establish the heavy industries that she required not in Japan but in Manchuria, and that is the main reason why Japanese have always loudly proclaimed that Manchuria was their life line and why, up to 1931, the maintenance and extension of the privileges enjoyed by virtue of her special position was the corner stone of Japan's foreign policy. Manchuria is considered to be for them a national interest as vital as the interests of Great Britain in the approaches to India.

Japan emerged from the Great War in a very strong financial position. She had built up a gold reserve of 700 million yen and her foreign balances and loans amounted to nearly 2,000 million yen. There were however grave distortions in her economic structure, the great earthquake of 1923 was a shattering blow and the history of the decade after the war is largely a tale of how these resources were used up in a series of desperate struggles to cope with financial and economic difficulties. In 1929 Japan returned to the gold standard. The policy was sound but its inception coincided with the onset of the world economic crisis. This aggravated her difficulties and in particular intensified the privations suffered by the farmers and peasants in the rural districts. It coincided also with the triumph of the Kuomintang—the Chinese Nationalist Party—both in China and Manchuria. In 1928 the walls of Jericho collapsed at the blast of the Kuomintang trumpet; the old War Lord government in Pekin, which had eked out for some years a moribund existence, faded away and the capital of the new, young and vigorous China was established at Nanking. The ruler of Manchuria—the young Marshal Chang Hsuch Liang—declared allegiance to Nanking and hoisted the Kuomintang flag. Manchuria was thus opened to Kuomintang propaganda and a vigorous rights recovery movement was quickly under way. An attempt was made to oust Russian control and seize the Chinese Eastern Railway but Soviet troops and bombing planes promptly invaded North Manchuria and the Chinese gave way. There was no cessation

however in the campaign to circumscribe Japanese treaty rights.

Opinion in the group conveniently described as the Military Party was formed largely by the young officers who mostly came from rural districts and were acutely conscious of the distress that the great depression had brought to the homes of their friends and relatives. Young officers as a class are not remarkable for political insight or maturity of judgment. They attributed all these ills—difficulties with Nationalist China, economic disturbances and agricultural distress—to the policy which Great Britain and America—in their own selfish interests as they believed—had forced upon Japan at the Washington Conference. The military party—discredited by the collapse of their idol, Germany, and by the failure of their own aggressions—had unwillingly accepted this policy in 1921, but by 1930 the young officers had good grounds for believing that public opinion was ready for a change. During the winter of 1930-31 500,000 persons were in receipt of relief in Tokyo alone and at this moment its silk market in America collapsed. The price of silk fell from 1,400 yen per picul in April, 1929, to 573 yen in September, 1931. On the 18th September, 1931, the Army in Manchuria staged the military coup which resulted in the seizure of the whole of Manchuria. This was the first step in a policy, the ultimate goal of which is the expulsion of all western influence from Eastern Asia and the establishment of Japan as the dominant state in this vast region surrounded by a ring of satellite states serving her needs. This policy is supported by the people of Japan and differences of opinion exist only as regards the timing and methods of each step. Moreover economic considerations, though an important factor, are relevant only in so far as wealth, prosperity and economic strength are the indispensable foundation of military and political power. This is clear from the course of events between the attack on Manchuria in 1931 and the attack on China in 1937.

The heavy military expenditure in Manchuria made it impossible for Japan to maintain the gold standard or a policy of balanced budgets. The Government that came into power in December, 1931, embarked upon a new policy of stimulating industry and agriculture by means of large Government expenditure financed by borrowing and currency expansion. The Finance Minister, Mr. Takahashi, calculated that after 4 years of reflation economic health would be restored and Japan could then return to normal sound finance. His policy was extra-

ordinarily successful. During the years of depression Japanese industry had made great efforts to reduce costs, improve efficiency and weed out its weak members. The Government controls then established were rapidly extended and adapted for the purposes of the new policy. New industries fostered by Government expenditure grew up and during the decade prior to 1936 there was an astonishing advance to a higher level of technical efficiency and organization and a remarkable improvement in the skill of the workmen. The diversification thus achieved relieved Japanese industry from its dangerous dependence on two commodities and two countries. But when in 1936 the Government desired to bring the period of reflation to an end their proposals met with violent opposition. In 1932 the direction taken by the new Government expenditure had been determined by the demands of the Military Party who had insisted on the adoption of a "quasi war time" economy and the fostering only of those industries that contributed to Japan's military power. By 1936 the military party had already launched a fresh aggression on China in the form of a disreputable so-called "autonomy movement" in the five northern Provinces. They wished to see the controls established under the "quasi war time" economy made permanent and the Government's proposal to return to normal methods provoked in consequence a military revolt in the course of which Mr. Takahashi was murdered. His successor was obliged to carry out the wishes of the army and when war broke out with China in July, 1937, there was a vast increase in expenditure and a great and progressive extension and tightening up of the controls already established over trade and industry. Intricate and elaborate measures were devised with the general aim of ensuring that no commodities should be imported except munitions and the raw materials required by the export trades, and that none of the imports or manufactures should be diverted to the home market. The hardships and difficulties involved were very great but up to, at any rate, last December Japan had not become a completely totalitarian state. The influence of those groups who still looked forward to the restoration of a free economy was sufficiently powerful to resist the more extreme measures pressed by those whose conception of an ideal State was one in which complete control was exercised over every economic activity. The latter groups were represented in the main by those who pressed the policy of the Southward advance regardless of the risk of war with Great Britain or America

or with both. The former group was led by Prince Konoye who believed that Japan's position of leadership could only be assured if the door were kept open for a return to normal political and commercial relations with America and the British Empire. If Prince Konoye had remained in office war would have been averted but he made the miscalculation that America might be persuaded to condone a Japanese conquest of China.

The Tojo Togo group, have also made an even more fatal miscalculation. It seems likely that the decision to attack both Great Britain and America was made on purely military grounds and the Japanese carry their passion for secrecy to such efficient lengths that it is probable that only the military members of the Government knew what was impending. The Japanese have always been extremely shrewd and skilful in estimating the material factors in a situation and shaping their course accordingly, but they have no gifts for reading the minds or forecasting the reactions of other men. From the military point of view the surprise attack upon Hawaii, for all its treachery, was a marvellous stroke and the initial advantage thus gained will carry Japan a long way. But this will not compensate for the failure to realize the shattering effect upon American opinion. America has come into the world war without a dissentient voice, grimly determined to throw the whole of her resources into the struggle without delay. The doubts and hesitations that have weakened Anglo-American action in the past have disappeared. There is complete frankness and confidence on both sides without any trace of the jealousies that usually paralyse the joint operation of allies. Unity of command has been established from the beginning and American officers are serving under British and British under Americans. Two months ago it would have seemed a fantastic dream that such a state of things could come about so soon. The Japanese have solved President Roosevelt's most intractable problem and in solving it have rendered their own ultimate defeat a certainty. Japan may overrun the whole of the territories that she hopes to include within her co-prosperity sphere but she cannot hold them after America has recovered command of the sea. It would however be folly to under-estimate the formidable nature of the task ahead. In the short period—less than a hundred years—since Japan emerged into the modern world she has shown, not once but several times, a capacity for making astonishing progress in a brief space of time and for accomplishing feats that were

thought to be impossible. The decade prior to 1937 was one such period of progress and there may well have been another since. Most of her activities have been shrouded in complete secrecy and it would be wise to be ready for more surprises.

The Japanese are united and homogeneous to a degree unknown in other countries and the differences of opinion that divide political factions are not wide. The extremists now in control believe that they can seize and hold the whole of East and South East Asia and defeat any attack upon them. They contemplate placing Japanese economy permanently upon a totalitarian basis and, so far as the vast region they aspire to control is not self sufficing, they propose to conduct such foreign trade as may be necessary upon a totalitarian basis. They do not fear the retaliations that a totalitarian system of trading may provoke because their control of this enormously wealthy region with its indispensable supplies of tin and rubber will place them in a position to dictate terms to other states however powerful or wealthy. When this extremist faction suffers defeat it seems probable that the history of 1914-1921 will repeat itself. Extremist doctrines will be descredited and a more moderate faction represented by Prince Konoye may come into power anxious to abolish totalitarian controls, restore a free economy and come to terms with Great Britain and America. It is too early yet to speculate on the conditions that may be produced among a highly emotional people like the Japanese by crushing defeat for the first time in their history. It is evident, however, that peace can only be assured in the Pacific if the Japanese people have the means of maintaining a reasonable standard of living without resort to the expedient of establishing political control over the territories where raw materials and potential markets are to be found. This can only be effected by a return to freer international trade in the world as a whole. Here again it is too early to attempt any assessment of probabilities but it is of course obvious that much will depend on the attitude that America will be ready to adopt.

NO MORE NONSENSE

By an Austrian

Judex ergo cum sedebit
Quidquid latet apparebit
Nil inultum remanebit.

THERE are those of us who fight Nazi Germany, and those who fight—Germany.

The first hold that the German nation can be divided into good and bad Germans. Their quarrel is with the latter only. The second exclude such a distinction. In their view, no separation is possible between the various elements of that vast compound. To them, the German nation is indivisible and in the words of an appropriate German proverb, it is a case of *Mitgefangen, mitgehangen*—caught together, hung together.

Each side has briefed eloquent counsel. To quote only the most outstanding names, there is Lord Vansittart with his *Black Record* and a series of articles in the *Sunday Times*; there is *The New Statesman and Nation*, over the signature of Mr. Kingsley Martin. Diametrically opposed though the two viewpoints may be, they have, however, one common, if negative, denominator. Neither expresses a positive post-war policy to be applied to Germany. There is no positive statement of policy in phrases such as "preventing Germany ever to use force again"—one of the few points on which both sides agree. Such generalities are not implemented by concrete proposals.*

Provided this war is won, what policy should be followed to deal with the German problem? There are principles and there are facts. What practical means have we, this time, to achieve the "Never again" slogan? The accent is on "practical." Principles, it would seem, are irrelevant if they lead to a new World war every twenty years or so. If anywhere, it is here that the end justifies the means—any means in fact to prevent a repetition of periodic tragedy. This is no

*In fairness to Lord Vansittart, mention should be made of a letter of his published in the *Sunday Times* of September 27, 1941. From that letter, it is clear that he has deliberately abstained so far from stating any peace aims.

attempt to write the next peace treaty at this early hour. Rather is it designed as a preliminary effort to define certain minimum aims considered essential if lasting peace is to be achieved.

Among the variety of views held, there seems to be a consensus of opinion on three or four tenets at least, sufficiently large to allow for a definition of minimum aims. Once these have been clearly circumscribed, the problem of ways and means should be much easier to tackle.

(i) There is consensus on the continued predominance of the military caste in Germany and of its old ally, heavy industry and "big business";

(ii) On the necessity of disarming Germany and, for the time being at least, of disarming her unilaterally;

(iii) On the need for an incisive reform of the German educational system;

(iv) Finally, though to a lesser degree, there is consensus on the necessity of re-organizing the Danubian states, both politically and economically, for their own good as well as in relation to the German problem in Europe.

Few people will dispute the predominance of the military caste in Germany. Its importance has grown, practically without interruption, ever since the early part of the 18th century. In former years, its members were chiefly drawn from among the landed proprietors, notably in East-Elbian Prussia. While the relative importance of the Junkers may have diminished in recent years, they still constitute the backbone of the fighting services.

With Germany's gradual industrialization during the second half of the 19th century, the industrialists have gained in relative importance what the Junkers may have lost. Socially, they are to-day their equals. This is true notably of the heavy industry in the Rhineland and in Upper Silesia. Its leaders share with the big landowners the same ways of living, they are tied to them by marriage, they belong very much to the same, if not to a higher, income bracket. Hence, there is similarity of views on the problems of leadership and on the all-important problem of distribution of wealth.

The power of these allied classes was only once in danger—and that to a very limited degree—during the chaotic years of 1918-21. When the excessive egoism of their economic and financial policy might have cost them their leading position during the final years of the Weimar Republic, they concluded an alliance, so far unbroken, with the National Socialist move-

ment. In so doing, they neutralized the only dynamic element among a compound of otherwise static forces. It so happened that it was also the only political movement capable of ensuring for them the support of a sufficiently wide section of the masses.

This is not the view generally held as to the equilibrium of forces in this new alliance. Many observers seem to think that the deal went all in favour of the Nazis. In a few years' time, a less provisional appraisal may become possible. No doubt, both the Junkers and industrialists had to make wide concesssions to their new partners. But there are no marionettes without wirepullers. In this respect, neither the Junkers nor big business seem to have been much affected by the new deal.

If this appraisal of existing forces be in the main correct, the first peace aim must be to break, deliberately and systematically, the political power of the wirepullers. True enough, the Nazis share their power. Yet they do so only by delegation, in the persons of their leaders and only for such time as these leaders can carry popular support. Failing such support, their comparatively small political, economic and social importance will become apparent to all. When the day of the great spring cleaning arrives, the new leaders will vanish. But Junkers and industrialists will remain and with them their very tangible sources of power: their estates, their factories, their mines, their hold on the Army, the Civil Service and the Judicature. Hence, the paramount importance of removing them from the helm, for good.

How? By a well-designed land reform for the Junkers; by a tariff reform for the industrialists.

Such a policy has not yet been tried. On the contrary, it would not be difficult to show that after Versailles, the Allied statesmen themselves, consciously or unconsciously, did a lot to put the men of the old régime back into the saddle. And it would be interesting to investigate to what extent class affinities prevailed over an impartial judgment of events.

In the case of the landowners, their great estates East of the river Elbe have always been the main source of their influence, nothwithstanding the fact that most of them are mortgaged to the last brick. But Germany is the country which first demonstrated to an astonished world the advantages of being "in the red"—thanks to the opportunities the debtor has for blackmail; provided of course he be sufficiently unscrupulous. It would be giving too much credit to Dr.

Schacht to believe he invented the method. He did nothing of the sort, he is no more than a pantograph. He merely applied the Junkers' carefully developed methods of economic blackmail in the field of international finance.

The influence of the Junkers can be broken by a suitable land reform. In other words, a distribution of their latifundia. Such distribution would (a) reduce their financial status, hence their social and political influence; (b) would create a rural middle class whose holdings would produce much smaller individual revenue. The new landowners, are unlikely either from their origin, their education or their tradition, to form a State within the State. At the same time, this would affect the Junkers' allies and satellites in the Civil Service. This applies to the Diplomatic Service, the Army (and notably, its General Staff) and, to a lesser degree, to the Judicature.

For the industrialists, a tariff reform is needed. Ever since the 1840's, when Friedrich List came out in favour of protectionism, Germany has more and more raised her tariff walls. It would be difficult to say whether that development ensued from general tendencies already geared on expansion, or whether protective tariffs led to expansionist tendencies. Judging from the whole trend of German history during modern times, the first is the more likely explanation. Be that as it may, tariffs, at first moderately protectionist, were gradually raised and finally turned into a weapon of economic warfare. This much is clear in any case: assuming Germany's whole foreign policy was concentrated on expansion during that period, no more logical complement could be found for it on the economic side than high tariffs. These trends of tariff policy were already quite patent in Wilhelmian days. The climax came with Hitler's drive for economic self-sufficiency. No economic self-sufficiency has any other but military justification. It then becomes a weapon just as much as tanks or aeroplanes.

This tariff policy had disastrous consequences for the rest of the world. A wide and strongly protected domestic market ensured to German industry the profits necessary to conduct a policy of dumping on foreign markets. And little did it matter to its leaders whether such exports, made for the sake of prestige or to further foreign policy, were paid for to a large extent by ransoming the German consumer. In later years, international marketing agreements and cartels further facilitated this policy, by even rendering exports profitable. In due course of time, other countries were forced to adopt a

protectionist policy in self-defence. It is unlikely that they would have done so of their own choice, for their aims were not exclusively directed towards expansion. Germany was thus placed in a position of building up huge industries many of which were not naturally competitive in the world market. Germany's industrialization was not only far-reaching, it was over-reaching and justifiable only if at the same time, the idea of war was taken for granted. Internally, its development was associated with lack of social equilibrium; externally, with political havoc. It could not have been maintained without artificial measures such as dumping, ever-rising tariff walls, exchange control and, in the last resort, armaments. A close analysis of Germany's economic structure leads to the conclusion that her " de-industrialization " would prove much more logical than a similar policy at present applied by her to France—apart from being considerably more salutary for restoring lasting peace on the Continent.

Without reversing this evolution by force, a lot could be done to restore normalcy by means of tariffs. A tariff reform would eliminate the more sinister aspects of German " big business." To achieve that, it would not even be necessary to apply unilateral measures. A general return to free trade, a simultaneous reduction of tariffs *taking into account differences in cost of production*, would deprive Germany of a position in world trade, frequently conquered by dubious means, at the expense of competitors either more scrupulous or less aggressive. The Atlantic Charter provides that the future Germany shall not be worse off, economically speaking, than her present opponents. It does *not* provide that she is to remain better off at their expense. It is not proposed to ruin Germany economically. That would help nobody. It *is* proposed to restore equality of competition. That is why a proviso is made regarding costs of production. Such a " saving clause " would play against her when her competitive position is unduly favourable; it would play in her favour when the opposite is the case.

We must disarm Germany. We must disarm her unilaterally, at the beginning of the process. That is the second point on which agreement seems general. But how?

The first attempt at controlled disarmament, after Versailles, proved a failure. In retrospect, it seems pretty clear that such failure was due not to technical, but to political difficulties between the controlling powers. Granted that many an industry may serve with equal facility peacetime and

wartime objects, yet even the most sceptical is likely to agree that a solid front, political and military, of the victors could have put the brakes on German re-armament, and in some respects might have foiled it completely. It is difficult to see any practical way of ensuring Germany's disarmament other than international control. But since such control proved abortive on its first application, perhaps some lessons could be learned from this failure, particularly on two points. Additional guarantees are necessary against any attempt by Germany to manufacture arms abroad and additional powers are required for the controlling organs.

To achieve these additional guarantees, an international treaty would have to be entered into between all countries interested in Germany's disarmament. That means the near-totality of the civilized world. Its application, in turn, requires international control. Additional powers to the men in control of Germany's disarmament cannot be effective without a sufficiently prolonged and territorially extensive occupation of the *Reich*. Without such occupation, the members of the disarmament commission will prove as powerless against sabotage as did their predecessors after Versailles. Moreover, no better means than occupation has as yet been devised of bringing home to the whole German nation the meaning of war and the signification of defeat. Its psychological impact is a necessary mental medicine which, as distinct from the previous Treaty, should not be confined to homœopathic doses.

The control commission must have effective powers. That means that it should not be a mere consultative body whose every action would have to be sanctioned by the governments at home. Such a Commission would be still-born. It must have both legislative and executive powers—the latter backed up by the presence of an army of occupation. If its decision were to be subject to appeal to the controlling governments or to an International Court, the commission should at least be able to enforce a stay of execution *lite pendente*. Whatever the formula chosen, no commission deprived of armed forces to back up its decisions is likely to succeed in a country such as Germany. Do we again want to see the growth of "sports" clubs and clandestine arms depôts? Many objections will be forthcoming. Are we to start Versailles all over again? In fact, would this not be Versailles *en pire*? The reply is that Versailles has sinned not by severity, but by leniency—leniency at least in its actual application.

Germany's permanent disarmament implies the spiritual demilitarization of the German nation, joint or several. That entails the end of her army of conscripts, the dissolution of its General Staff—and this time, a disbandment not only on paper. In actual practice, it is difficult to see how this object could be achieved without depriving at least three generations of Germans of any military training whatsoever. That means a period of between 60 and 75 years. Must we maintain measures of coercion during the full length of that period? In principle, the answer is positive although circumstances may influence their enforcement in practice. German military tradition and notably, the tradition of its General Staff must be blotted out to vanishing point. This proposal one might expect to provoke another outcry of those who prefer justice for Germany to justice for their own countries. Do you want to maintain actual occupation for 75 years if necessary? Again, the answer is positive in principle. And who will pay the cost of that occupation? That, one should say, remains to be seen. But supposing the worst, namely, that we had to pay for it, that would still be a very cheap war risk insurance premium to pay, compared with the cost of a world war every 25 years. Besides, why should not Germany be able to pay for that cost? If there are to be reparations in some shape or form—and the case against economic reparations is strong—this would surely be the very minimum. Rather should we forego other economic and financial reparations whose moral justification is crystal-clear, but whose practical enforcement may do more harm than good.

There is, of course, one immediate objection to the views here expressed. By unilateral disarmament, Germany would secure an enormous relief of her financial burdens and would, moreover, increase the economic productivity of her population. The rejoinder is that there is no real objection to such an increase in economic productivity provided we ensure, by other means, a pacific outlet for this increase. Moreover, it is comparatively easy to compensate this alleviation in Germany's financial charges by an equalization tax to be levied by the controlling powers as long as they have to maintain active arms control on German territory. Such a tax involves, of course, the problem of transfers. The objections are well-known and not to be overlooked. But it may be pointed out that Germany has always succeeded in transferring considerable amounts when it was a matter of putting aside reserves of foreign exchange for the purpose first of financing rearma-

ment and later of financing the war itself. It was only when she had to pay reparations that Germany could not, or would not, find the foreign exchange required to discharge her obligations. Subject to a careful investigation of actual figures, it might be found sufficient to limit the yearly amount of equalization tax to the sums which Germany transferred annually on average between the years 1931 and 1939. After a period effective control of disarmament may, this time, enable the controlling powers to cut their own military expenses. Such a natural counter-part of Germany's disarmament should bring about a gradual and proportionate reduction in the equalization tax.

Thirdly, the German educational system requires a radical and incisive reform. This does not refer merely to such pseudo-sciences as *Rassenkunde* and similar pseudo-scientific teaching. These absurdities will die even before their inventors. It applies with even more reason to pre-Hitlerian teaching and, in particular, to the educational staff. Germany has always found among her teachers the scientists to provide her with the instruments for her aggression; the jurists to justify these aggressions; the philosophers at last to build them into a system of ethics—German ethics of course. A Hanoverian king, finding himself in conflict with seven professors of Goettingen University on points of constitutional liberty in the early forties of the last century, dismissed them summarily with the remark that "professors and prostitutes could always be had for money"—a hard judgment on these seven men among whom were the brothers Grimm, the philologists. Yet, the king knew his Germany.

A century later, German university teachers warrant this royal judgment even more. You will not find these days anyone among them to raise points of constitutional liberty. Secondary teaching merely follows the example set by the universities, minus some measure of discretion. Only teachers of primary schools—very likely owing to their social origins—made an exception during the first years of the Weimar Republic. Since then, there has been time for a change. To place the German educational system back to a level compatible with the general standards reached by European civilization, it would no doubt be necessary to dismiss 95 per cent. of the educational staff, the balance to be retained only after careful individual examination. Independent and genuinely liberal spirits have disappeared from the teaching profession since the exclusion of all adversaries of the present régime.

Their elimination has proceeded with unerring judgment. A judgment truly admirable in its infallibility were it not so evidently based on Gestapo spying.

No practical solution of this important problem seems anywhere within sight. Without a total collapse of the German structure, no sufficiently radical and durable revolution is likely to occur in the German conscience. Nor may we ever expect to hear a *nostra culpa*. In this province, a complete change of heart would have to take place such as is unknown to history since the birth of Christianity. Importation of teachers from abroad would meet with great obstacles, the problem of numbers alone being insuperable. These difficulties notwithstanding, measures of coercion may become necessary, here as elsewhere, should there be no spontaneous clean-up from within.

Unification of the Danubian countries is the fourth point on which there is at least a marked measure of agreement. Pending the enactment of collective security by a League of Nations or any other more practical method, the necessity of establishing a demographic, military and economic counterweight to Germany cannot be dismissed. But clearly, this object cannot be achieved by maintaining the past split-up of the Danubian territories into antagonistic national States none of which, individually, has a chance of survival. This subject requires separate examination and is only mentioned here in passing.

These are, in brief, the essential aims which any future peace settlement with Germany will have to achieve if it is to have some chances of permanency. Such a programme is bound to encounter resistance from many quarters. For instance, the conservative elements in all countries, the U.S.S.R. excepted, will oppose a "planned" diminution of their social "opposite numbers" in Germany. The cloudier type of pacifists upheld by the ministers of the various established churches are likely to invoke anew those Christian principles which are so conspicuously absent from our present world. These circles will not see that in the absence of any spontaneous change of heart—unlikely to arise—measures of coercion will be unavoidable in the case of a nation which has deliberately rejected the principles they invoke. In the main, these peace aims will have to count on the support of the bombed-out.

Let us all remember the words of a German. "The Germans have had a Kant and a Goethe" wrote Schopenhauer," but the

nation in general suffers from a spirit completely obtuse and from absence of all judgment." In that, we may trust Schopenhauer whose spirit was neither obtuse nor devoid of judgment. Since the majority of the Germans will not or cannot think for themselves, we shall have to think for them and to act in consequence. Germany's internal affairs, her future régime and economic welfare are our concern. In a world which new means of communication have reduced to a fraction of its former size, no nation can claim any of her affairs to be wholly internal. In the name of "internal affairs," we have had to watch the destruction of the whole of Europe. Meanwhile, we have been concluding treaties and gentlemen's agreements with its destroyers. Let there be no more agreements for which we supply the gentlemen and they—the agreement. No more nonsense, please.

TOWARDS A CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY

By Hugh Ross Williamson

THE words 'Christian Democracy' have the merit of focussing an argument. To some, democracy appears as so obviously the political embodiment of Christian principles that the adjective is redundant. To others, the phrase is a startling contradiction in terms. The former regard democracy as society organized in such a way as to give expression to belief in brotherly love and the worth of each individual soul. The latter, accepting the Spenglerian analysis: 'In the form of democracy, money has won,' see in Christianity and Democracy the outward manifestations of those eternal opposites, God and Mammon. And so long as men attach mutually exclusive meanings to the same word, the present chaos of thought and action must continue. Men of good will find themselves, as 'democrats' and 'anti-democrats,' ranged as enemies whereas, if each defined his attitude instead of covering it with a catchword, they might discover themselves fighting side by side as friends.

These notes are an attempt to contribute to a resolution of the unnecessary quarrel; and as those who assume that democracy is the political embodiment of Christian principles probably far outnumber those who hold that democracy is (and by its nature must be) the negation of Christianity, it may be well to start with the more conventional view.

The essence of this view has been well expressed by Mr. Middleton Murry:

> British democracy is not based on the principle that the voice of the people is the voice of God. Much more fundamental to it than a belief in the wisdom of a temporary electoral majority is the acknowledgment that the British citizen has certain basic rights, known as the liberties of the subject.

And in so far as this is the meaning attached to 'democracy,' it is incontrovertibly Christian; for Christian doctrine has always recognized the individual's need for free self-expression. Without this there can be no development of personality and thus—from both the natural and supernatural standpoint—no ultimate responsibility.

If the democrat were to go further and insist that the limitations on real freedom are more often economic than political, he could hardly find a better statement of his position than the following:

> The immense number of proletarians on the one hand and the immense wealth of certain very rich people on the other are an unanswerable argument that the earthly goods so abundantly produced in this age of industrialism are far from rightly distributed and equitably shared among the various classes of men . . . In our days not only is wealth concentrated but immense power and economic domination are concentrated in the hands of a few, and those few frequently not the owners, but only the trustees and directors of invested funds.

This, however, is not an extract from a democratic manifesto, but the official attitude of the Catholic Church as defined in the great Encyclical of 1931, *Quadrigesimo Anno*. And herein lies a clue to the cause of the confusion. The democrat would maintain that, in democracy, he has the means by which the wrongs can be righted. The anti-democrat, on the other hand, will retort that the state of affairs described in the Encyclical *is* democracy, and that justice and liberty can only be restored by the destruction of democracy. "But what you are calling 'democracy,'" says the democrat, "is really plutocracy, which, I would agree, has in all ages been condemned as the worst form of government." "That," replies the anti-democrat, "is precisely the point. 'Democracy' is the cloak which plutocracy assumes in order to deceive decent men." And it must be admitted that the facts favour the anti-democrat.

When President Roosevelt remarked that it was a disgrace for a country with the highest standard of living in the world that one out of every two Americans called up for military service should be below the normal physical or mental standard, he was voicing an indignation which every democrat would share. But every anti-democrat took it for granted and was only surprised that the proportion was not higher than 50 per cent. For he did not confuse the ideals which inspired good democrats with the facts of democracy in practice and he knew, from American statistics published in this country in the autumn of 1940, that, on the one hand:

> Three families in the United States control a huge share of the nation's industrial wealth. They are the du Ponts, the Mellons and the Rockefellers. Together they own stock valued at £350,000,000 in 200 American industrial corporations. Thirteen families actually have stock holdings totalling £670,000,000;

and, on the other:

> One in every three Americans is living below the 'safety line' of nutrition necessary to good health.

The question at issue thus resolves itself not so much into a debate about the facts—which are not, as far as they concern the two great democracies, pre-war Britain and present day America, seriously in dispute—as to whether the conditions which are deplored by honest democrats and anti-democrats alike are accidental to or inherent in democracy. Is "Government of the people by the people for the people" the way of national salvation or the formula for national suicide? Are "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" the *open sesames* of a better world or the pointers to a new dark age? Are the three great wars which have decimated Europe in six generations the birth pangs of the Utopia announced in 1789 or the inevitable and retributive consequences of the fatal decision of 1789?

II.

That the outward form of democracy has not expressed the true spirit of democrats is to-day too obvious a point to labour. The idea that the 'will of the people' is synonymous with a majority of heads (not brains) counted once every five years has always been ridiculous and is at last being generally proclaimed as such by the apathy of the electorate. The idea that the interest of the people as a whole can be represented by an assembly composed of the obedient nominees of two rival caucuses, each fighting for the control of the money power that it may use it in its own sectional interest, has led to the use of 'politician' as a term of contemptuous abuse. 'Freedom of the Press' has come to mean merely that 'an editor is free to express as many of his proprietor's prejudices as his advertisers allow.' A party system based on a geographical franchise and the principle that the means of propaganda, whether cinema or newspaper, may be freely owned by anyone rich enough to buy them has not led to a democracy of which any democrat can be proud. The freedom of the free shark in the free lagoon was not what the libertarians meant.

This discrepancy is the more disturbing because it is hardly a case of a good idea being spoilt in execution, or of sound premises mysteriously leading to corrupt conclusions. The fault lies in the idea itself. It is the premise that is false.

'Government of the people by the people for the people' is—if "by the people" be equated with plebiscitary democracy—merely a piece of muddled thinking. For 'the essence of common democracy is quantity,' whereas 'Government for the people' implies quality of the rarest kind.

To submit every cause and question and taste to the arbitrament of the majority is to act on the assumption that 'there is a peculiar inspiration in the opinions of the ignorant.' If from this reckless appeal any standard survives, it can be only the standard of money and 'popularity': and those who interpret the scorching irony of *Vox populi, vox Dei* as statement instead of sarcasm should not be surprised if the majority prefers gods made in its own image.

In his essay, *Associating with Shakespeare*, Granville Barker wrote some years ago:

> I find in an old notebook of mine something written by A. D. Darbishire, the biologist, who died on active service in the War. This is it: 'A flaw in the construction of an aeroplane may endanger the life of one man . . . but a flaw in our conception of life may endanger the whole of humanity and condemn it to an existence from which the sudden end of an airman would be a merciful deliverance.' We are all now speculating pretty grimly upon what the next hundred years may bring. One thing seems certain: they will put to a hard test democracy and its methods. Shall we or shall we not prove able to work this complicated machinery of civilization by constant appeal to the opinions of the mass of the people? And the answer may be: No, unless their conception of life can somehow be enriched. Here comes the claim of art to be of service. For art stimulates imagination. You cannot hope to make the whole mass of the people substantially knowledgeable in the thousand matters which now concern it. So sometimes imagination must be made to suffice; the cultivated sixth sense which will be alive to the difference between the false and the true . . . I would not prescribe a compulsory course of Shakespeare's tragedies to a mind debauched by the sillier sort of cinemas and the middle pages of the Yellower Press. All you can do is to set up your monuments of great art, like cathedrals raised above the sordid squalor around, as witness of your faith. And, if the faith is not a vain one, it will draw men to them.

In the ten years which have elapsed since the writing of that, the situation has become more grim and, though the diagnosis has been sufficiently confirmed, there is hardly the same attraction about the half-way gospel of 'the redemption of all things by Beauty everlasting and the message of Art.' The return must be to a sterner and more certain Gospel.

III.

"Love God," said Augustine, "and do as you like." Those

who are pleasurably attracted by the second part of the sentence are apt to ignore the first, on which it depends. The creed of 1789—a date which is useful as a symbol rather than exact as a definition—might not unfairly be described as an endorsement of the second and a repudiation of the first. Men were to do as they liked, but they were not to love God or even —unless they were eccentric reactionaries—to believe in Him. The order of the day was " Liberty, Equality, Fraternity."

Yet, no less than Augustine's statement, these qualities are virtues only in so far as they radiate from the central Christian belief. Unless liberty is interpreted in the light of individual self-discipline in the sight of God, it becomes something worse than license. Men are certainly equal before God and no individual soul is of more value, at that Tribunal, than another. But they are not equal anywhere else. The one glaring fact of human life, in every department of it, is the *in*equality of man. (" Men are not born equal," writes J. B. S. Haldane and predicts that " the progress of biology in the next century will lead to a recognition of the innate inequality of man." I quote this for the sake of those who place more reliance on the pronouncements of scientists than in the results of their own observation or belief in orthodox Christian teaching). As for ' Fraternity,' it is probably, divorced from its Christian context, the most dangerous concept of the three. One remembers Clemenceau's murmur: ' Ah, yes, Cain and Abel, Cain and Abel ' when urged to allow the claims of ' brotherly love '; and one has seen ' fraternity ' degenerate into that ' humanitarianism ' which has been so aptly defined as ' sentimental self-indulgence in the filth and famine of others.' And it is persistently forgotten by those whose idea of religion is to quote uplifting texts out of their context that Christ's command, " Love one another," was addressed specifically to eleven men after He had deliberately by the prayer of Segregation (" Lord, I pray not for the world but for these Whom Thou hast given me ") excluded everyone else.

' Fraternity,' in the Christian sense, does not mean and never has meant that a man should love all other men because they are his ' brothers.' It means that he should love all other men because they are God's sons.

Liberty, Equality, Fraternity have been defined as

> Liberty meaning ' I can do as I like ': Equality meaning ' You're no better than I am ': and Fraternity meaning ' what's yours is mine if I want it.'

This, which appears to those who still regard the words idealistically an unpleasant piece of cynicism, is in fact a correct description of the watchwords of a democracy which is not Christian. Cut off from the source of virtue, Virtue itself becomes Vice. And "lilies that fester smell far worse than weeds."

IV.

It would seem then that, if democracy is to fulfil the aspirations of those who have believed in it and even died for it, it must submit itself to be taught and tamed by the Christians. That there is an uneasy suspicion that something of the sort may be necessary is evidenced by the growing concern over Christian education; but unfortunately many of those who are most vocal in demanding that the Church should 'do something' are also of the opinion that what she should 'do' is to conform to the standards of 'democracy' instead of to demand that her own standards should be at last accepted. The Church must show 'tolerance'; she must 'come into line with modern thought'; she must 'align herself with the political demand for social justice'; she must 'use up-to-date methods.' In other words, she must adopt precisely the errors which have led the world into the catastrophic condition from which she is now asked to extricate it. Good men, who have forsaken dogmatic Christianity but retain a respect for its ethical content, ask the Church to come to the aid of the democratic state as a somewhat apologetic ally, whereas she can come only as an uncompromising teacher, demanding obedience. Which means that, finally, the initiative must lie with the Church herself.

As Christopher Dawson has put it:

> In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the whole trend of Western civilization was hostile to Catholicism. The absolutism and realism of Catholic philosophy was incomprehensible to an age which followed Rousseau and Kant, or Bentham and Herbert Spencer. When Pius IX denied that it was the duty of the Church to come to terms with Liberalism and Progress and Modern Civilization, his pronouncement was greeted with a chorus of execration from every country in Europe. It seemed as though the Papacy was pronouncing its own sentence of death, for the triumph of material progress seemed inevitable and no one could conceive the possibility of its failure. To-day all this is changed—Liberalism and Progress and Modern Civilization appear in a very different light from that of seventy years ago.

The Church, in her teaching, must reject the basic assumption of democracy—that man is naturally good and that

therefore the decision of the majority of men will be a wise decision—because the Truth, on which she is founded, is that man is naturally evil and that the majority decision will thus tend to intensify the evil. She will insist that Swinburne's "Glory to Man in the Highest, for Man is the master of things" is, quite simply and lucidly, blasphemy. At the same time, she will be even more emphatic that every man is not only potentially good but potentially a saint and that his business is to develop and practice sanctity. And within the tension of that paradox, all the aspirations of democracy will fall into their proper place.

There will be liberty, equality and fraternity; but not anarchy, 'averageness' and interference. There will be 'Government of the people by the people for the people,' but the emphasis will be on 'Government.' True to her fundamental mission, she will, as the representative of God, wage the unceasing war against Mammon. (She has always denounced usury and the failure to pay proper wages as sins). But at the same time she will insist that, though adequate bread is necessary and a right, man does not live by bread alone; and she will have no concern with the barren political warfare between 'left' and 'right' which is founded on self-interested materialism.

Oliver Cromwell once told parliament that the mind was the man; with an impure mind man was no better than a beast and a beast could not rule: the State must be controlled by the seeing eyes and the single hearts. "But to this conviction" comments one of his biographers, "he added another which made him a democrat of an extreme type in his ultimate ideals. His religion taught him the transcendent value of every immortal soul, even though dwelling in the humblest body. He dreamed of an aristocracy of quality where the best would govern, but all would be the best."

It is some such synthesis which, out of the present chaos, is again taking shape in the minds of well-intentioned men. At the moment, there is confusion because of the use of labels which divide instead of a Creed which unites. But 'Christian democracy,' if the Church can rise to the responsibility of the hour, may still be made a reality.

And, after all, if by reason of contradictory stresses it proves again unworkable, there is always Christianity *tout court*....

THE PROBLEM OF THE SMALL STATE

By Sir J. A. R. Marriott

We shall never sheathe the sword . . . . until the rights of smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation.

MR. ASQUITH'S words spoken early in the war of 1914 sound terribly ironical to-day. With Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Serbia, Greece, Rumania lying helpless in the grip of Germany the promise made by the British Prime Minister must seem sheer mockery. Yet Mr. Asquith was indisputably right—apart from the propaganda value of the recent violation of Belgian neutrality—in putting the sanctity of the rights of small nations in the forefront of the war aims of the great nations then allied against Germany.

It may well be that in 1918 the principle was carried too far. For the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire the diplomatists of Versailles were not to blame. Bohemia, Austria, and Hungary had declared their independence before the Peace Conference met. Even if the fate of Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary, in 1940, could have been foreseen, even if the allied diplomatists had endeavoured to restore the Habsburg Empire, they would have been impotent in face of the determination on the part of the Slavs, Teutons and Magyars to break that Empire in pieces, and set up for themselves as sovereign powers.

The doctrine of nationality was in 1919 sacrosanct. The boundaries of States were to be made to correspond as precisely as might be with the demarcating lines of nationality. Moreover—apart from the idol of nationality—publicists were insistent on the value of the small State *per se*. Sir John Seeley, while deprecating the identification of bigness with greatness had in 1884 insisted that the future lay with great states—states of the type of the United States of America and Russia. It was on that ground that he urged that Great Britain should unite with its Colonies in an organic federation of self-

governing but closely associated communities. But by 1919 even the British Empire was in no mood for federal union.

Mr. E. A. Freeman had argued in his *History of Federal Government* (1863) that the multiplication of small states accentuated the possibilities and increased the probability of international wars. Nor can his argument be ignored, though perhaps it may be turned. But in 1919 politicians and historians were in a different mood. They were insistent upon the value, political, social and above all cultural of the small state. They pointed, with great effect, to Palestine, to the City-States of Athens, Florence, Geneva, to small communities like Elizabethan England and Weimar. What big state or great empire has ever in little more than a century produced or nurtured a Pheidias and a Praxitiles, a Sophocles, a Euripides, an Æschylus and an Aristophanes, or nurtured an Aristotle and a Plato? The modern world is never likely to see again the City-State which was a characteristic form of the ancient and medieval world. Are big states likely to produce a Dantè, a Shakespeare, or a Goethè? How great the debt which we in England owe to-day to the agricultural and educational experiments of a small state like Denmark. In 1914 Herbert Fisher argued that the debt of civilization to small states is incalculable. The City-State, he said,

> besides serving as a school of patriotic virtue was not in the main of the blustering and thrasonical type, but refined and sublimated by every grace of instinct and reason. It further enabled the experiment of a free direct democratic Government to be made, with incalculable consequences for the political thinking of the world. Finally, it threw into a forced and fruitful communion minds of the most different temper, giving to them an elasticity and many-sidedness which might otherwise have been wanting or less conspicuous and stimulating, through the close mutual competition which it engendered, an intensity of intellectual and artistic passion which has been the wonder of all succeeding generations and such as can never be reached in great states organized for the vulgarity of aggressive war.

That is well said, though we may discern in Mr. Fisher's enthusiasm for small states a trace of the mid-Victorian Cobdenite assumption that while small states are necessarily pacific in temper and policy, big states are necessarily "organized for the vulgarity of aggressive war." That was doubtless true of the France of Louis XIV, exuberant in the consciousness of recently achieved national identity and unity. It is certainly true of modern Germany, permeated by the Prussian doctrine of the efficacy of "blood and iron." But it is not true of the United States nor of the British Empire.

Both are big states, yet neither is "organized for the vulgarity of aggressive war." Nor was the Third French Republic. Organized for war it was, but purely for defensive war—for the defence of its own frontiers or the protection—unhappily inadequate—of allies, unable to protect themselves against the might of Nazi Germany. The existence of big states which are as pacific in temper as any small community does not, however, in the least degree invalidate the argument in favour of the preservation of small states, which, though no longer reliable as buffers between their big neighbours, are invaluable as affording opportunity for a variety of experiments, social and political.

But how, in view of the prevailing tendency towards larger aggregations are the small nation-states—states with populations of anything between 3 and 13 millions, to be preserved? The tendency to aggregation, has, indeed, prevailed only in comparatively recent times. The great nation-states have become the prevalent form of polity only since the fifteenth century. (England, it is true, was exceptionally precocious in realizing its national unity, but not until the eighteenth century was well advanced did Great Britain become a big state). The middle ages were characterized not by diversity but by unity. France was a bundle of feudal principalities, Spain was a congeries of kingdoms. In Germany there were 360 sovereign states down to the end of the eighteenth century, and throughout almost the whole of the nineteenth century there were still 39. The Roman Empire, in its death agony, bequeathed to medieval Europe the idea of a World-State embodied in two institutions, the Holy Catholic Church and the Holy Roman Empire. There was a time as Lowes Dickinson said:

> When the whole civilized world of the West lay at peace under a single ruler; when the idea of separate sovereign states always, at war or in armed peace, would have seemed as monstrous and absurd as it now seems inevitable.

Whether the medieval world was so peaceful as the *laudator temporis acti* suggests is doubtful, but it is undeniably true that the virtual dissolution of the medieval empire and the circumscription of the authority of the medieval church permitted the emergence of the modern states-system which, from the sixteenth century onwards, has formed the basis of European polity.

The apotheosis of the sovereign state has resulted, as we are all painfully aware, in international anarchy, accentuated by the periodical outbreak of international war. Nor can the

apologists of the small state deny that the formation they favour has not merely failed to provide buffers, but has actually tempted aggressively minded great states to further aggression against powerless neighbours.

The dilemma presented to the world to-day would seem then to be this: either we must acquiesce in the German ideal proclaimed in August, 1914, the ideal of universal peace sustained by the naked sword of Germany, or we must devise some system which will permit and, if possible, guarantee the survival of relatively small communities, sovereign if not self-sufficing.

Shortly before the outbreak of the present war Mr. Clarence Streit published in *Union Now* a very elaborate scheme for a Federal Union between the democratic states of the world. His proposals, clear cut and courageous, attracted wide attention and evoked criticism both constructive and destructive. War came. Mr. Streit has recently made a much more simple and less ambitious proposal for an *immediate* union between the United States of America and the nations of the British Commonwealth.* He was, seemingly, impelled to make the proposal by the impending fall of France, by the danger which in the summer of 1940 appeared imminent, that the British Empire would similarly succumb to the attack of the mechanized forces of Germany, and not least by the last minute proposal made by Mr. Churchill to the French for a political union between Great Britain and France. Of Mr. Streit's present proposal it can at least be said that it is far less fantastic than Mr. Churchill's despairing gesture to avert the surrender of France. Mr. Streit appears to imagine that the constitution of South Africa is federal (p. 210) though it is in fact (technically at least) unitary. He also says that Mr. Churchill's offer to France suggested a *Federal* Union, but that is not within my recollection. In order to meet the criticism that the British communities might decline to join a Federal Union in which the U.S.A. would be predominant Mr. Streit rather airily replies:

> Let us invite them: If they refuse to do with us what they offered to do with the French, then the responsibility of destroying without a trial, the hope that Union gives for peace and freedom would be theirs alone. Surely they would not refuse.

Yet on the face of Mr. Streit's proposal it would appear that in Congress the U.S.A. could outvote the whole of the British Commonwealth (plus "Eire") by 131 to 72, a proportion

**Union Now with Britain.* Cape. 1941.

which, even if corrected to some extent by the composition of the Senate, looks, to Britons, more like absorption rather than Federalism.

For the moment I do not wish to pronounce either for or against Federal Union either in the original or the amended form suggested by Mr. Streit, and by Mr. Curtis and other enthusiasts in this country. What I do wish to emphasize is the importance—not ignored by the Federal Unionists—of avoiding the errors which *ab initio* wrecked the experiment of the League of Nations. That experiment was at once too ambitious in conception, too cumbrous in machinery and in executive action too timid.

Lacking a common purse and a common police force, requiring unanimity as a preliminary to action between great nations, whose responsibility was relative to their wealth and power, and small countries which risking little or nothing were reckless in council, the League though not ineffective in regard to minor disputes and small states was impotent in dealing with Great Powers like Italy and Japan. But the root cause for the failure of the League was that like the Holy Alliance it was merely a League of Governments and not a Federation of Peoples, and above all that it was a creation and not the outcome of a gradual process of evolution. Only those Constitutions which have grown, which like Topsy were "never born," are destined to endure.

It may be objected that the Constitutions under which the people of the United States, of Canada and of Australia are living to-day are embodied in a single document. That is true; but only superficially. The Constitution which proceeded from the Philadelphia Congress embodied the results of a long process of evolution. The men who "made" the American Constitution were descended from ancestors who had brought with them from Great Britain the tradition of local self-government. There is not a single feature of the Federal Constitution which did not derive from one or other of the Constitutions of the Component Colonies. The Presidential Executive; the Senate and House of Representatives; the Supreme Court of Justice—all these characteristic features of the Federal Constitution have their prototypes either in the Constitutions originally devised for the British Colonies in North America or in the several revolutionary Constitutions of 1776-1780.*

*This point is emphasized by S. G. Fisher: *Evolution of the American Constitution* (1897) and more casually, in Marriott: *Mechanism of the Modern State*, vol. i.

Again it is true that the constitution of the Federal Dominion of Canada rests upon a single Act (with subsequent amendments) of the British Parliament. But the British North America Act of 1867 represents a long process of evolution, it embodies or discards the results of the experiments of 1791 and 1840. Similarly the several colonies which now form the Commonwealth of Australia had all gone through an evolutionary process from Crown Colonies to semi-self-governing Colonies and from the latter to complete Responsible Government. The fact that the British Parliament ultimately passed an Act for the Union of South Africa and for the Federation of Canada and Australia does not weaken the argument in favour of gradual evolution as opposed to 'creation.'

* * * * *

What is the relevance of this truth, or this contention, upon the problem immediately under discussion? Merely this: we can move on only step by step. I venture, with all apologies to reproduce words which I used while the League of Nations was in process of formation and which were intended as a warning against precipitancy.

> It will be the task of prudent statesmanship gradually to transform a League into a Commonwealth; a temporary alliance into an organic polity, endowed with the organs appropriate to the higher stage of political development . . . But to attempt to include in such a Commonwealth States which are in very different stages of political growth is only to court the failure which inevitably overtook the League of Autocrats [of 1815] . . . . Similar experiments will escape similar disaster only if membership in the League is, in the first instance, confined to States reasonably equal in power, not disparate in Governments inheriting similar traditions, and inspired by common ideals. To attempt more is to risk all.

Much more was attempted in the Covenant of the League of Nations, and the result was the unfortunate failure of an experiment from which all men of goodwill had hoped much.

My practical suggestion, then, is that we should now proceed much more cautiously and modestly. The British Empire is, as Field-Marshal Smuts said during the last war, "the only successful experiment in international government that has ever been made." Let us start from that. The experiment of setting up an Empire War Cabinet in 1917 seemed, at the time, a step towards federalizing the political institutions of the British Empire. It was intended, as Mr. Lloyd George informed the House of Commons on May 17, 1917, that the Empire War Cabinet should become a permanent part of our

political machinery. That intention was not fulfilled. The Paris Peace Conference registered a definite reaction. Centrifugal forces reasserted themselves in the British Commonwealth. The spirit of nationalism in 1919 proved too strong for the centripetal forces which during the preceding war had brought into being the Imperial War Cabinet. During the present war we have, despite the superb contribution made by the Dominions and by India to the common effort, not repeated the experiment initiated by Mr. Lloyd George in 1917. Suggestions to that effect have frequently been made, but they have not, thus far, been accepted.

Is it that the Dominions fight shy of the renewal of the experiment of an Imperial Executive? If it be so, what are the prospects of a complete Federal Union even for the British Commonwealth? For a Federal Union would, on any hypothesis, necessitate a reduplication of all the organs of government—legislative and judicial as well as executive and administrative. But if we cannot even federate the British Commonwealth, the prospect of the Union advocated by Mr. Streit between the British Commonwealth and the U.S.A. would be hopeless and still more the prospect of the wider Federal Union to include all the "democratic" states of the world, or even of Europe, to which in his earlier essay Mr. Streit looked forward hopefully.

All this may savour of pessimism in regard to a solution of the problem of the small state. I am no pessimist. Assuming, as we must, the defeat of the Axis Powers, there will presumably be at least a period of respite for the small states now enslaved by Germany. And then? Then I would go slowly, but with the hoped-for solution ever in view. I should then hope to see a realization of the dream of a Federal Union between the several nations of the British Commonwealth. Next, I should hope to see it include all English-speaking peoples, and gradually extended to other nations willing, and able, to give the guarantees which must obviously be the condition of membership. *Ohne Hast, ohne Rast,* is a valuable precept in politics. Let us apply it, with hopefulness but without impatience to the solution of the problem of small states. Those states are, in my submission, essential to the progress of civilization. This is, I submit, the only possible means of securing their survival.

THE REFUGEE

By Lord Dunsany

IN England, on the downs,
Where wild things fly and creep
Far from the noise of towns
And summer seems to sleep
And bells from distant sheep
Tinkle through dreamy air,
Only last August there,
In a chalk valley deep
Where went past elm and willow
And haunt of fox and hare
By wandering ways a stream,
Flashing its little billow
And fading like a dream,
There in a garden lit
By rays enchanting it,
Level and gold and long,
Gilding the midges' throng,
Where tall delphiniums were
And hollyhocks grew strong,
I saw a spirit sit,
Singing a doleful song.
Around her where she sate
More bright was every hue
Of flowers and grass, more blue
Delphiniums were, and through
The leaves the level, late
Rays shone more bright and all
Near her was magical.
Behind her a dark yew
Rose up. She was as tall.
I spoke and asked her who
Tended that plot so small,
Where she had come to wait,
So hidden from great things,
For she seemed something great,

One who might speak with Fate
Or mend the ways of kings.
And at my questionings
She turned and said that she,
Now poor, was Liberty
And once had wide estate
And that her eastern gate
Was of old far away,
But, of her lands bereft,
This English garden, deft
With little paths that stray,
Was all that she had left.
Far through that garden lay,
Like some enormous oak
Felled by a lightning-stroke,
And left where weeds' decay
Cover it like a cloak,
A long mound on the clay,
Through which there flashed a ray
Which weeds could not conceal,
As though a thing of steel
Were hidden from the day,
Something akin, for wonder,
To hurricane and thunder.
And now the sun dipped under
The old down that I knew
And dim the spirit grew.
(The bees had ceased their plunder
And small birds homewards flew)
The spell was going too
That lately had enchanted
This spot the spirit haunted,
Where flowers of mauve and blue
And white and pink were planted
And, dazzling, dancing through,
The evening rays had slanted.
Now dim as though I dreamed
The fading spirit seemed
While flashes no more gleamed
From the half-hidden thing.
"Spirit," I quickly said
As she was vanishing
"What is in that long mound
Which weeds are burying?"

She spoke with scarce a sound,
But silence hung so dead
And heavy that I heard,
For now no more a bird
Or insect, even, stirred
And in that hush profound
She said " In English ground
Here I have hid my sword.
But I will go abroad,
To France, to France again,
And once more be adored.
Once more shall rise my star
Where the great clusters are
And I will travel far
With millions in my train."
She vanished, and the heap
Where the great sword had lain
Seemed nothing but a steep
Long bank where ivies creep.
The hush resumed its reign,
And over down and plain
All nature seemed to sleep.

RUDYARD KIPLING: ENTHUSIAST

By Joseph Braddock

ELIOT on Kipling—I admit that I was surprised!* Temperamentally, these two very considerable literary figures seemed to me to be in almost fatal opposition. I thought of the Kipling whose gusto I had cherished as a boy, whose writings have given the whole world pleasure, a born writer with his enthusiasm for the hurly-burly of life, the "common muck of the world," with his magnificent objective vision. And then I thought of the precise, ascetic figure of Mr. Eliot, sophisticated, "twitchingly sensitive," not for the masses; the high priest of literature beside the part-entertainer, the esoteric opposed to the popular, the cult against the craze. But then I remembered that Mr. Eliot is also a distinguished critic, as well as a poet, and I began to read his thirty-page essay to his own selection of Kipling's verse. I was reassured.

Into the vitiated literary air of the nineties Kipling's early stories and poems must have come like a breath of ozone. He had allowed glimpses of the Seven Seas and the Five Continents to penetrate into an artificial hot-house, and stood revealed first and foremost as a writer of action. As book followed book and the scope of his work unfolded, the range, strength and originality of this new writer were apparent; his vision of action, tonic, astringent, calling to adventure, appealed to the everlasting boy in the entire Anglo-Saxon world, and soon his vogue was as great, or greater, than that of Dickens in a previous era. Moreover, he had a vocation—he was sure of himself. What he had to tell was alluring. His gusto was unmistakable, springing as Arnold Bennett would have had it from his passionate sense of "the interestingness of life" so that for a time he was read to the farthest confines of Empire, and in America, everywhere and by everybody, often by those who did not normally read much at all.

When with the advance of the new century the tide of taste had turned against Kipling the change was alleged to have been due partly to his now discredited appeal to Imperialism and also to his over fondness for explicit or implicit preaching. After the disillusion of four years' slaughter the twenties were understandably in the mood for

**A Choice of Kipling's Verse.* Made by T. S. Eliot, with an essay on Rudyard Kipling. *Faber and Faber.* 8s. 6d.

neither. About this time I remember Mr. Desmond MacCarthy observing apropos the works of Kipling that what kept the then younger generation from appreciation was the same barrier which prevented their elders from enjoying the latest novel by Aldous Huxley—objection in each case to the moral tone of the author! Well, let us admit Kipling's faults from the outset in order to come back more quickly to an examination, with the help of Mr. T. S. Eliot, of his many and splendid virtues. The faults are, I suppose, stridency, too easy moralizing, and a kind of cocky knowingness that irritates the reader. Yet all great writers have the defects of their qualities (though hasty objections often spring from imperfect knowledge), and who would forego the experience of Wordsworth because he often wrote feeble doggerel: of Proust because his sentences are sometimes boring and interminable, of Shakespeare because passages in the plays are padded with fustian or rhetoric? Kipling's opulent gifts far outshine his defects.

Mr. Eliot's essay is profound, packed with suggestiveness and full of "meat." He sidles round his subject with something of the detachment and cunning of the Cat that walked by himself, and by the time we come to the end we find that we have been helped to appreciate Kipling on a deeper level, that our ideas have been changed. Our enthusiasm has been stimulated to examine the prose and verse with a fresh mind. Kipling is not only a great writer; he is, it seems, an extremely intricate one, and has been ably defended "against the charge of excessive lucidity." After tracing the starting point of Kipling's verse to the motive of the ballad-maker and indicating the debt to Swinburne and Browning (*McAndrew's Hymn* and *The 'Mary Gloster'* are dramatic monologues, though metrically and intrinsically ballads) Mr. Eliot praises his technical virtuosity and invention, his "consummate gift of word, phrase, and rhythm," and answers the question as to whether Kipling wrote poetry with the remark that, while Kipling's verse sometimes rises to the intensity of poetry, Kipling was not trying to write poetry at all. To have done so would have interfered with his intention.

> Unless they please they are not heard at all.

This does not "imply a value judgment" on Mr. Eliot's part, it is simply that Kipling's poems are intended to *act* rather than to *be* and that they therefore lack "a musical pattern of emotional overtones." So Mr. Eliot solves this problem by making the claim that Kipling wrote "*great* verse," though unfortunately what great verse *is* is never exactly defined.

Mr. Eliot's second important point is that Kipling's "prose and verse are inseparable; that we must finally judge him, not separately as a poet and as a writer of prose fiction, but as the inventor of a mixed form." Here, I agree—the later Sussex books bear it out where in *Puck of Pook's Hill* and *Rewards and Fairies* the "unit is a poem and a story together

or a story and two poems." I would only ask if this main contention does not apply to other writers as well, to D. H. Lawrence for example? I have always felt Lawrence's work as one.

More aspects of Kipling's content are touched upon in this admirable critical essay than I have space to deal with in my article, but Mr. Eliot helps to clear away some popular misconceptions. There has been, and still is, a tendency in certain modern quarters to label Kipling Fascist, or at least as a forerunner of Fascism. This is not only unfair, it is untrue, for "no-one was farther than he from interest in men in the mass, or the manipulation of men in the mass: his symbol was always a particular individual." Again, with regard to Kipling's Imperialism Mr. Eliot writes: "I cannot find any justification for the charge that he held a doctrine of race superiority. He believed that the British have a greater aptitude for ruling than other people, and that they include a greater number of kindly, incorruptible and unselfseeking men capable of administration." His reflections on the Boer War "are more admonitory than laudatory."

By a curious paradox perhaps a phenomenon which operates against a whole-hearted acceptance of Kipling is his almost invariable artistic success. He achieves brilliantly whatever he sets out to do. Again and again in the animal stories, the soldier stories, the horror stories, and the historical-fairy stories (and their equivalent poems) one is forced to applaud at the end with "brilliant!" But Mr. Eliot has noted the element of *tour de force* "which makes some readers uncomfortable." The writer is almost too clever. His detachment is as that "of a visitor from another planet," with something of the hard, bright beauty of de Maupassant. And yet "Kipling knew something of the things which are underneath, and of the things which are beyond the frontier." But Kipling's first purpose, "his aim, and his gift, is to make people see—for the first condition of right thought is right sensation—the first condition of understanding a foreign country is to smell it, as you smell India in *Kim*," his greatest book.

> Then the night fell, changing the touch of the air, drawing a low, even haze, like a gossamer veil of blue, across the face of the country, and bringing out, keen and distinct, the smell of the wood-smoke and cattle, and the good scent of wheaten cakes cooked on ashes.

When we come to the verse itself—and Mr. Eliot here gives us 123 poems—we admire the strength and the accomplishment, as also the range of subject-matter, although in general Kipling's voice will be too loud for some tastes. But it is often the cheerful din of the brass band, sometimes of the music-hall. The familiar things are here, *Mandalay*, *The Song of the Banjo*, unforgettable when you have once read them, the admirable '*Bobs*,' and many others. The British soldier is drawn true and not sentimentalized. Mr. Eliot picks out *Danny Deever* for special

scrutiny and praise, drawing attention to the effectiveness of the recurrence of the same end-words and the use of half-rhyme in building up an atmosphere of horror.

'What's that that whimpers over'ead?' said Files-on-Parade,
'It's Danny's soul that's passin' now,' the Colour-Sergeant said.

He comments, perhaps significantly, on the word *whimpers*. This is the way the world ends. He goes on to call Kipling a great hymn writer on the strength of *Recessional*, indicating that Kipling could have done more in this vein. He points out too that a gift for prophecy appears with authority in *Recessional*, as well as in that remarkable poem, *The Storm Cone* written as late as 1932.

This is the midnight—let no star
Delude us—dawn is very far.
This is the tempest long foretold—
Slow to make head but sure to hold.

Stand by! The lull 'twixt blast and blast
Signals the storm is near, not past;
And worse than present jeopardy
May our forlorn to-morrow be.

Finally, Mr. Eliot draws attention to Kipling's gift for epigram. The *Epitaphs of the War* are many of them fine and repay close study. The reader who enjoys quieter poetry will do well to examine the poems belonging to Kipling's final Sussex period when "imperial imagination changed to historical imagination." Indeed, in this group of poems the nature lover will most probably find some pleasant surprises, lines like "I've buried my heart in a ferny hill," phrases such as "Spring's full-facèd primroses." I confess to a surprise when poems like *The Way through the Woods* and *The Run of the Downs* brought Edward Thomas to my mind, though of course Kipling's muse is less shy and his music far less subtle. Other excellent poems in the book are *Cities and Thrones and Powers, Mine Sweepers, 1914-18*, and *Song of the Galley-Slaves* from *The Finest Story in the World*.

I return to my original conception of Kipling as a born writer and enthusiast, and will let him speak for himself.

It is enough that, through Thy Grace,
I saw nought common on Thy Earth.

If Mr. Eliot in *A Choice of Kipling's Verse* should have given the reading public the stimulus to re-examine the whole work of this extraordinary, able, and varied writer, he will have done us a good service. His essay is of the best type of criticism. And Kipling has made a substantial contribution to our heritage.

WHAT ARE GERMANY'S PLANS?

By Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn

So much depends on tactical results during the next few days and weeks that comments on the current situation would almost certainly be outdated before they could be published. Current events, however, make it tempting to look further ahead and speculate as regards possible developments of the Axis' plans, especially those of Germany.

It may be presumed that Germany's immediate object is now to stabilize the front in Russia with the least possible expenditure of men and material, and it seems improbable that she will attempt to open a new offensive front until the spring, not only on account of climatic conditions, but in order to gain time to reorganize and to make good the immense wastage that the Russian campaign, and to a lesser extent the war in Libya, has cost her.

Will she, however, renew a major offensive in Russia as soon as weather conditions are favourable, or is it conceivable that she will stand on the defensive there and undertake a major campaign elsewhere? Ready as the German General Staff always seems to be to modify their plans and to switch from one immediate objective to another provided that it is an enterprise with a bearing on the main object, it is difficult to believe that they can afford an indefinite postponement of a fresh attempt in Russia.

For one thing to stand on the defensive on so wide a front against an opponent so active and with such an extraordinary power of recovery would not mean an economical use of Germany's resources. It is certain that it would lock up a large proportion of her air force and armoured formations. For in modern mechanized warfare the defence must possess strong and highly mobile reserves. The numbers of her armies of occupation would also materially reduce the forces which would be available for a major campaign elsewhere, and with the growing strength of the Allies it would not be easy to find a theatre where they could be attacked in superior force. Spain and North-West Africa, with the connivance of Pétain and Franco, is of course a possible outlet where a force of moderate size might be employed, but the entry of the U.S.A. fully into the war must make Spain increasingly an unattractive theatre; for even if the U.S.A. took no active part in operations American reinforcements sent to Britain would release strong forces now retained there by the threat of invasion. General Auchinleck's recovery of Cyrenaica, even should he go no further, reduces the prospect of Tripoli and Tunis becoming a base for an offensive campaign. A major campaign in

Turkey with Iraq and the Canal zone as its ultimate objective presents more difficulties than ever, now that Turkey could receive help both from Russia and Britain. The mere fact that Turkey was not attacked when in a much weaker position is an indication that the German High Command realized that to force a passage through Asia Minor would be no easy undertaking. The ingenious plot by which Turkey would have been by-passed and the Iraq oilfields together with the pipe-line through Syria would probably have been acquired intact, cannot now be repeated. The Iraq oilfields have in fact ceased to be an objective of immediate value, for even if captured their products would not become available till both the wells and pipe-line had been restored. Yet the capture of oil supplies must more than ever be of importance to Germany after the demands made on her oil reserves by the Russian campaign, and in view of the demands it will continue to make, whether the campaign is conducted offensively or defensively. Since the Caucasian oilfields are the only source from which Germany could hope to get increased supplies within a reasonable time it may be concluded that their capture will be a governing factor in German plans. Everything in fact points to a renewal of the offensive in Russia as the main German commitment this year, with the capture of Caucasia dictating its main direction. Quite apart from the consideration that to remain on the defensive in Russia would be a shattering admission of failure, the fact that so great a part of the *Reichswehr* would in any case be engaged there suggests the simplest course would be to reinforce it for offensive action. The occupation of Caucasia would obviously be a main objective since in addition to providing Germany with new sources of oil supply it would have a disastrously crippling effect on the Russian war effort.

The question is, what subsidiary enterprise is Germany likely to undertake? If Russia is to remain the chief offensive theatre it may be expected that she would, in the first instance, look for a field where direct influence on the issue in Russia could be brought to bear. What would appear best to fulfil that condition would be an attack on Turkey with the limited objective of securing control of the Dardanelles zone.

That would give her a conveniently placed theatre to which she is in undisputed control of lines of communication—one in close proximity to Rumanian oil supplies and within easy range of many established aerodromes. Moreover, as it would not entail a long advance and as, presumably, Bulgarian and Italian assistance could be counted on, it would not entail any wasteful diversion of resources from the Russian theatre. If the Straits were opened to the passage of the Italian Fleet and German U-boats, the assistance which could be given to a German drive towards Caucasia is obvious. The Russian Black Sea Fleet could no longer play the important part it has taken hitherto, both in transporting troops and in co-operation with coastal operations while, on the other hand, safe sea communications would be invaluable to the Germans in maintaining the supplies of their southern armies, and in offensive

amphibious operations. The persistence of the attack on Sebastopol at heavy cost, even after the port had become untenable as a base for the Black Sea Fleet, is a further indication of the German intention, not merely to cripple the Black Sea Fleet but to obtain a base for their own use. Preparations that the Germans have already made in Bulgaria and in the captured Greek islands clearly constitute a threat to Turkey. If the threat matures it would probably be in early spring for the weather would then be favourable and the Germans might hope to bring the operation to a successful conclusion before the drying up of spring mud permitted the main offensive in Russia to open.

There are of course other subsidiary enterprises the Germans might undertake which would have a direct bearing on the Russian campaign as well as on the general conduct of the war. One may be an attempt to capture Malta by an air invasion during the time when air operations in Russia are limited by winter conditions. If Malta fell, not only would reinforcement of the Axis Army in Libya become a less dangerous business, but it would affect British power to assist Turkey. It would become more difficult to supply and reinforce our Middle East forces and entail the retention of greater numbers in Libya, whether for offensive or defensive action. The heavier units of the Italian Navy have so far played but a small part in protecting communications with Libya, and with Malta in Axis hands their movement to the Black Sea would not appear materially to affect the risks convoys would still encounter.

If Russia is again to become the theatre for German offensive operations, would it necessarily entail the abandonment or postponement of a direct attack on Britain? I suggest that it must, for that would demand a major effort by the *Luftwaffe* probably just at the season when the great and growing Russian air power would demand a maximum concentration of the *Luftwaffe* to meet it.

The gist of my argument is that Germany is bound to make Russia her main theatre of war this year, and that she would naturally undertake only such subsidiary operations as would affect the main theatre. Russia has shown that she has an unexpected capacity for offensive action and purely as a defensive measure Germany must deprive her of that capacity; for Russia forms the only base from which the *Reichswehr* can be fully brought to action and defeated. It seems inconceivable that Germany should allow Russia's offensive power to grow unchecked and the most obvious way of checking it would be to deprive her of the main sources of her oil supply. Moreover, by attacking her she would tend to relieve Japan of her greatest immediate danger—an attack by Russia.

Can the most optimistic Germans now believe it is possible to achieve a crushing and decisive defeat of the Allies? Surely the best they can hope for is to attain a position of stalemate while retaining immense bargaining assets in their hands. That position cannot be reached while Russia retains her offensive potentialities and while she remains a base from which the other

allies can co-operate. Amazing as the Russian recovery has been it is hardly possible to believe that she can either fully develop her own offensive power or deprive Germany of hers during the next few months. Meantime the Japanese war must to some extent reduce the contribution the Allies can make towards expediting the full development of Russia's potential strength, and an early attack on Turkey would have a similar if lesser diversionary effect.

For all these reasons, unless the present Russian counter-offensive can achieve successes beyond all reasonable expectations, a renewal of the German offensive in the late spring or early summer may be expected, for it must not be forgotten that Germany has passed a number of obstacles, has advanced her starting line by hundreds of miles since last June and has now a well organized system of communication behind it. That the main offensive would be preceded in the early spring by an attempt to secure the Dardanelles zone seems probable, and a still earlier attempt to capture Malta is a possibility. Only in case the present Russian offensive achieved such success as to make a renewal of the German offensive out of the question does it seem likely that invasion of Britain as the last desperate course would be attempted; for the threat of invasion still serves its purpose, and failure would remove the threat in the course of a few days.

THE NAVAL AIR ARM

By Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond

EVENTS in the Far East, in particular the losses of the American Fleet and the sinking of the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, have corroborated to the full the opinions of those who, for many years before the war, pointed out that aircraft are integral units of a navy; as integral, in fact, as submarines and motor boats and every other type of fighting instrument which takes part in the operations of sea warfare. The failure to recognize this simple, and indeed elementary, fact at the time of the separation of the naval flying service from the rest of the navy was a most egregious blunder which has cost us dearly during the present war. Confused thinking was at the bottom of it, on the assumption that a new means of propulsion and action in a different medium were reasons for constituting a new service with the instruments so propelled and acting in the new medium.

The criterion by which the "Service" to which an instrument belongs should, in actual fact, be determined by the object of the operations which that service has to undertake. The operations of a navy have as their ultimate object the command and control of the sea. The immediate aim of the sea fighting forces is to destroy these forces of the enemy which, fighting at sea, oppose the establishment of command and the exercise of control, and to interrupt those communications by sea on which the enemy's efforts depend. All the "weapons" with which the warfare at sea is conducted are units of the sea forces; and they are indissolubly linked with each other. The greater surface ships need the protection of the destroyer against submarine attack, of aircraft against air attack; the destroyer needs the support of the air in air infested waters; the merchant ship which conducts the communications must be protected by battleships, if threatened by them, by cruisers against cruisers, by destroyers against smaller vessels, submarines and aircraft. The business of locating an enemy at sea is one in which, as the *Bismarck* chase illustrated, surface and aerial craft both play their parts. The repelling of a waterborne invasion is, in part, an affair of sinking the transports of the enemy in which surface vessels, submarines and aircraft are all concerned and between whom there must be the most intimate connection. In all of these, as well as in many another of the many operations of sea warfare, a complete co-ordination of the three arms, surface, sub-surface and super-surface is essential. A common doctrine must govern their strategy and tactics, the instruments themselves must be designed for the purposes they have to fulfil, the men

who use them must be trained to the work at sea. It is for the sea-commander to determine the objectives of his strategy, and he must possess both the means and the power to distribute them in the manner the circumstances demand.

It is necessary to recognize a clear distinction between the *continuous* operations of the struggle for command and control and those other special and temporary operations which are undertaken for a particular and specific purpose, and are of a conjunct nature—the capture of a base, a diversionary operation, an excentric attack from the sea or the expulsion of an enemy's forces from an area—in which land and sea forces have so often acted together. Given the necessary good understanding between the commanders and in all ranks—a condition that has not always existed, as all students of history are aware—effective co-operation between the services is possible for the execution of the particular enterprise: this, however, differs wholly from the continuous, unceasing struggle at sea for command and control, in which an unified command, which comprises and disposes of all the combatant forces engaged in it, is absolutely necessary; and even in those temporary operations the naval forces must be complete in all their units. The sea commander must be able to command the services of all the vessels and craft acting at sea, the minesweepers, surface flotilla craft and aircraft which act in combination in the offensive and defensive operations at sea: he must no more be dependent upon the good offices and inclinations of another command for his security from air attack than he is for his security against mines and torpedoes.

All of this is, one would have thought, very elementary. Nevertheless, it took many years to obtain recognition in the re-establishment of the Naval Air Arm, or, rather, its partial re-establishment. The return of some of the air forces which operate with the Navy was both tardy and incomplete; and it was made too short a time before the outbreak of the present war for a naval air flotilla to be built up with fit types, in adequate numbers and equipped and trained for service at sea. It is because of this delay and partial restitution that we have suffered some of the serious losses of the last two years.

Among the effects of the false assumption that there is a distinction between the forces acting in the air and those on and under the sea was the waste of effort in the first stages of the operations of the defence of shipping in the Western Approaches, where surface and air forces were engaged on the common task. While the surface forces worked upon one system of trade protection the air forces worked upon another. Long "reconnaissance" flights were made in the belief that enemy submarines, being thereby kept from coming to the surface, were rendered unable effectively to attack the merchantmen. It was a complete delusion. The results of these flights, in which a great number of aircraft took part and used many a gallon of petrol, were practically negligible. Very few submarines were sighted, a few more

tracks were seen, the number of attacks made could probably be counted on the fingers, and it is questionable whether a single submarine was sunk. The slogan "we keep them down" was, so far as it had any practical interpretation, a pure figment of the imagination; and hardly less was the belief that the rare occasions of sighting were of any practical assistance to what were called the "hunting flotillas." Indeed, hunting in open waters offers very small prospects of success, as the experience of the last war showed. The German submarine commander may have found it a nuisance to be sighted, but he can hardly have found that it interfered seriously with his operations. The ineffectiveness of this divided command was at length realized after seven months. In April, 1940, the air forces acting in defence of trade to the Westward were placed under the "operational" command of the navy, though the flying boats, essentially naval craft, were still for a time withheld. When the Fleet Air Arm was resurrected in 1937 the transfer was fettered by the utterly illogical compromise that only those aircraft which operate from ships should come under the Navy; those working from shore bases were to remain under the Air Force. This decision showed a complete want of clear military thinking. It made the point of departure of a particular type of fighting instrument a determinant of the service to which it belongs, ignoring the self-evident fact that all naval craft, of every type, make their departure from a harbour.

However good the liaison between the land and air forces may have been in the first Libyan campaign, that between the sea and the air was incomplete. While the military advance was prepared by a "strafing" of the enemy's airfields, no such a preparation preceded the movement of the highly important convoy during whose passage through the Sicilian Channel the aircraft carrier *Illustrious* was severely damaged and her services lost for many months, and the cruiser *Southampton* sunk (Jan. 10, 1941). The movement of an important convoy is a major operation of war—who does not remember that many of the great sea battles from the Dutch wars onward had their origin in the movement of a convoy, that Anson's and Hawke's battles in 1747, the first of June, even Trafalgar related to convoy movements; and that Gibraltar would have been taken by the enemy if the three convoys that brought relief during the great siege had been stopped? But in the movement of last January there was no attempt made to clear the way by previous or simultaneous attacks on those enemy aerodromes from which the aircraft proceeded which dealt us the serious blows to the two valuable ships. Air attacks were made on the Sicilian aerodromes *after* the event and considerable damage claimed; but how much better to have made them before!

Again, the attack on Taranto was made with a very small force of the older types of craft to which the navy was committed through having been fettered by the system of production. Contrast that attack, successful as it was, with the scale of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. The naval air arm of the

Japanese being wholly naval it was possible for the Japanese navy to develop it in the best manner; and it is to be noted that two-thirds of its units operate from shore bases. The Fleet Air Arm made that courageous attack with "a few six or seven year old 'Swordfish' biplanes, just capable of carrying one light torpedo at a speed of about 100 miles an hour" (Sir R. Keyes in *News Chronicle*, Dec. 18, 1941). Nor does the evidence of want of liaison stop here. Every schoolboy knows that tactical victory needs always to be consummated in a relentless pursuit, yet this victory was not followed up by the analogous operation of pursuit: that is to say, by attacks to complete the business by inflicting further damage, by crippling of the Dockyard at Taranto and the operations of repair, by bombing of the dockyard town and driving the workmen away. The naval air resources, limited as they have been by the preposterous policy, were insufficient to carry out this desirable strategy of pursuit and the Italian ships, or some of them, have since been repaired without interruption. The battleship crippled at Matapan regained port, but no attempt to complete her disablement has been reported. It is difficult to imagine that, if the navy were in possession of the air forces that it needs, this Hotham-like policy of inaction would have been followed. This is no time for saying, as that Admiral did: "We must be contented, we have done very well" but rather for following the Nelsonic principle: "Had we taken ten sail and had allowed the eleventh to escape, *when it had been possible to have got at her*, I could never have called it well done." Unless the navy possesses all the fighting craft which take part in its operations there is bound to be this failure to attain the results which opportunities offer in war.

It has recently been argued by a writer described as an Air Correspondent* that "the functions which are possible from a shore base are not at all the same as those that are possible from an aircraft carrier" since the short range of fighter aircraft prevents them from giving support to a fleet except when close to the shore. Support to a fleet from the shore must be given, the writer says, by long range fighters and these will always be inferior to short range fighters. This is a truly extraordinary line of reasoning. It ignores strategy; it ignores the ultimate object of the forces taking part in the operations of war at sea; it makes the range of a fighter the determining element in the service to which an instrument belongs—materialism pure and simple. The Japanese, as remarked earlier, have not been misled by such sophistries. If, as the action off the Malay coast appears to show, the Navy cannot depend upon enjoying the co-operation of the Air Force's long range fighters when engaged on a hazardous operation like that in which the two battleships were lost, and that other in the Sicilian Channel to which reference has been made —and there are others—the lesson is plain: it must possess its own, just as it must possess, and be able to distribute, according to the needs of the situation, the destroyers and other craft that complete its establishment. Is

Daily Telegraph, January 2, 1942.

it possible to imagine the surface and submarine and mine sweeping forces as separate commands to which the Admiral of a battlefleet must make application on every occasion in which he needs their service, and even then cannot be sure that he will receive the support for which he asks? Of course it is unimaginable. It is indeed true that at the height of the submarine campaign in the last war a proposal was made by some submarine enthusiasts in France to constitute a separate and "independent" submarine navy; but the good sense of the French naval staff prevented the perpetration of the absurdity. Yet the relation of aircraft to sea warfare differs in no wise from that of the submarine of twenty years ago. At the risk of boring the reader with repetition it must again be said that aircraft, like submarines, are integral units of a navy and that this is not altered by the facts whether they fly from a ship or from the shore, or whether they are long or short ranged. Range is wholly immaterial in the matter—naval craft are both long and short ranged, from the motor torpedo boat to the ocean going cruiser.

The long separation of the control of the air forces engaged in naval work from naval control has had, I am convinced, much to do with such want of foresight as there has been of the potentialities of the air in sea warfare. If officers and men are to be fully trained in all the branches of the sea strategy, tactics and technique of the combined arms which constitute a fleet of to-day it is essential that there shall be the most complete interaction and confidence. The existence of a spirit in which one arm seeks to depreciate the powers of another, instead of seeking to discover the best methods of co-operation in strategy and tactics, is thoroughly harmful. No one who has followed the course which the controversy between the protagonists of the "battleship" and "bomber" took for some years, in which each did its utmost to prove the total uselessness of the other, can be unaware of the effects which this has had upon our preparedness to employ effectively our own conjunct forces and to master the efforts of our enemies. There was an almost analogous conflict before the last war between the "submarine" and "surface" schools of thought. Submarines were trained, and lived, in a watertight compartment, and it is not too much to say that the undefended condition of the naval bases at the beginning of the war in 1914 was in no small degree due to this isolation. The assumption had been made, some years previously, that the difficulties of navigation of the Firth of Forth and the Pentland Firth and channels leading into the Flow, were so great that no submarine could effect an entry; and when, about a year before the war, doubts were expressed as to whether this judgment, formed as it had been in the early days of submarines, still held good, it was indignantly denied that any need for a revision of the view was needed. The high officer who thus rejected the proposal to reconsider the question was out of touch with submarine developments and unaware of the fact that, in recent exercises, submarines had penetrated into the Firth. A proposal to make the submarine flotillas a part of the fleet was rejected on the grounds that it would check progress, and I have no doubt that the segre

gation of submarines from the surface commands was a prime cause of want of acquaintance with the ways and powers of those vessels that led to a lack of precaution, both in harbour defence and in cruising at sea, which resulted in avoidable losses. It was the insecurity of Scapa Flow that caused the transfer of the fleet to another and less well situated base, and to the sinking of the *Audacious*. The segregation of the air from the sea has had, I am convinced, equally unfortunate results.

The writer previously mentioned claimed among other things that there is a particular advantage arising from the Coastal Command remaining under the Air Force, though engaged on naval operations. Its units, he said, need bomber and fighter support occasionally when so engaged, and are able, by virtue of their position, to call upon their sister commands for that help. A naval air arm could not make this call. The answer to this amazing statement is that if the naval air arm were properly constituted it would comprise both the bombers and fighters which are needed in the course of its *normal* operations. In operations on a larger scale, of an abnormal character, the co-operation of the services would come into play as it has always done when a conjunct naval and military operation of the type and object previously referred to was undertaken, precisely as the general in command in Libya can call upon the Air Forces in that theatre to combine their efforts with those of the land forces. If the navy cannot count upon receiving this assistance at these exceptional moments the only solution is that its own air forces should be strong enough to meet its needs. That, however, should not be necessary if a proper distinction is made between the different types of operations, the normal and the exceptional. The difficulty does not often arise, though it has arisen occasionally, in the combined use of the navy and the army, and there is no reason why it should arise in the case of the navy and the air service.

It is high time that we began to think objectively instead of subjectively and to recognize that a change has taken place in naval warfare as radical and far reaching as the changes from the oared to the sailing vessel, from the armed transport to the artillery carrier, from the sailing to the steam driven ship; and the tactical and strategical changes introduced by the invention of the torpedo which conferred "battle value" on the flotilla and imposed restrictions upon the movements of surface ships from blockade to the protection of commerce. Each new agent, whether a weapon or a weapon carrier, which is capable of taking an effective part in the operations of war at sea needs to be incorporated in the sea forces; and for all its novelty—if not indeed by reason of it—this rule applies as fully to this the air weapon as it did to its many revolutionary predecessors.

AIR POWER IN THE FAR EAST

By Air-Commodore L. E. O. Charlton

RECENT events in the Far East have been very largely hinged on air power, and there would appear to be a long road yet to travel before we, the Allies in that distant theatre, properly appreciate its uses and abuses when exerted over a field remote from metropolitan radii of action. As regards Pearl Harbour it is surely puerile to accuse the Japanese of treachery when they perpetrated their surprise attack. Does one expect an assassin manfully to declare that he is about to stab you in the back? Knowing the nature of the beast, and realizing that the times are out of joint, one walks about on guard and warily. The U.S.A. possesses flying boats of the Catalina order which have been contrived for the main, if not the only, purpose of carrying out long distance sea reconnaissance, and which have a noble range of flight. But we do not hear, nor are we permitted to infer, that the Pacific Ocean had been scoured in all directions, at the limits of their air endurance, by these winged leviathans, intent on the prevention of just what was allowed to happen and on proving that history, in that particular, could not repeat itself. Because of that sleepiness and lack of precaution, coupled with the fact that the U.S. Naval Intelligence was unaware that a considerable portion of the Japanese Fleet, including several aircraft-carriers, had put to sea, the enemy was able, treachery apart, to strike a master-blow, inflicting thereby serious loss, deranging the Pacific War Plan, carefully prepared to meet the eventuality of such a conflict, and jeopardizing the safety of the whole Far-Eastern situation, not excepting that of Singapore. All this, be it noted, was accomplished in little more than an hour by the clock, and at breakneck speed, by Japanese aircraft flying off the decks of the most vulnerable sea-going craft afloat, and within, comparatively, close range of their objectives. Could any campaign in a major war have more disastrously commenced? It was indeed a case of air power in the ascendant!

In the islands and archipelagos of the Western Pacific, which constitute the true Far East, the English-speaking Allies are everywhere feeling the pinch of enemy air superiority, an inevitable result of Japan's commanding situation as the Air Power on the spot. One of the most lamentable effects of the surprise air attack on the Philippine Islands, that fateful Sunday morning, was the damage thereby sustained from the bombing of the U.S. airfields, the equipment of which, owing to the huge distances involved and because the enemy fleet commands the neighbouring waters, is at present and for a long time will be irreplaceable. From this it followed naturally that the

Japanese were able to assert a local air mastery from the very first, freely introducing aircraft from the Chinese mainland and Formosa to occupy the captured airfields of Luzon, and assembling fleets of transports, under air and naval escort, to effect such landings, diversionary or in force, as their strategy demanded. The remnant of the U.S. air force responded gallantly, sinking the battleship Haruna and damaging another of the Kongo class, while life was in it, but waves of bombers persistently attacked the airfields and soon succeeded in crushing all resistance from the air. As at Pearl Harbour, so in the Philippines, the efficacy of well-planned air surprise had proved itself again, the success of the invading forces being due, in more than all else besides, to the workings of the enemy in that element.

Hong Kong is another chapter in the same recital, although here surprise was lacking. The loss of the Colony, within the space of a few days at most, was a foregone conclusion owing to the setting of the board when Japan commenced hostilities. Both isolated and beyond all reach of succour, it was immediately deprived of any overhead protection as soon as British Kowloon, on which a solitary aerodrome was situated, had been overrun by the superior Japanese mainland forces. Thereafter it became a practice target for the aircraft of Japan in whatever force she cared to use against it, with no air resistance to encounter and able to maintain a perpetual assault by day and night. So assured was its fate in these circumstances that it seems a pity it had been so recently reinforced. The two Canadian units, at a late hour thus introduced, would have been invaluable at Khota Baru, in Northern Malay, when the enemy invaded the Peninsula on the same day that Hong Kong was attacked. They, and the remainder of the garrison, are now in captivity, and only our Imperial High Command know the purpose that was served by their brave, but Quixotic, resistance in a hopeless situation.

Turn we to Malay, and to that sea bastion in Far-Eastern waters Singapore. Here as well we are far outnumbered in the air, witness of that melancholy air procession overhead wherein the hostile aircraft come and go at their own sweet pleasure, and in privacy. The British public have derived much comfort from the periodical announcements that reinforcements have reached Singapore, which invariably included large-sized air detachments. They were further comforted by the knowledge that an Air Officer of vast experience, and wide repute, had been given the Command-in-Chief of that key position. All is well with Singapore, they said, knowing the immense importance of the place. And yet nowhere has the situation more deteriorated, taken as a whole, than in that particular portion of the globe. Our chain of air bases, constructed at great cost in order that fighters, and other short-range aircraft, might be flown from India to Malay, is now in enemy hands and available for a hostile purpose. Those few remaining to us are becoming scarcer as the enemy forces wriggle through the jungle and worm a way ever southwards towards Singapore. Such a development might not, excusably, have

been foreseen in the piping days of peace, nor even at the outbreak of the Western War. But Japan, in pursuance of her Nankai ("South Sea") policy, began to show her hand directly she put pressure on French Indo-China soon after Marshal Pétain, in June, 1940, sued Germany for an honourable peace. We have therefore been given eighteen months' notice of probable developments in the South China Sea and lands adjoining, a period of grace which we do not seem to have put to good advantage. As for Thailand, not much diplomatic acumen was required to be certain that the attitude of that modernized state would be determined by the circumstances in the event of the Nankai policy being implemented by Japan. Our air base chain from Burma southwards was put in peril directly the Vichy representative in Indo-China acceded to the Japanese demands. Eighteen months is a long time, in the midst of war, for new plans to be hatched, and a Commander-in-Chief, himself an Air Officer and notoriously air-minded, might surely have considered the practicability of fashioning an alternative chain, via the Andamans, the Nicobars, and Sumatra. in substitution for the one endangered. We might not thus be witnessing, once again, the sad spectacle of a Malayan air empty of British aircraft, though crowded with the aircraft of Japan.

Hardly had we at home become aware of the worsening of our affairs in this respect, when news of the naval disaster assailed our ears, a direct consequence, it can only be inferred, of the deteriorated situation in the air. To dilate on that tragic happening, at the present stage of our information, would be both ill-timed and superfluous. The facts, as far as the general public is concerned, are plain and unadorned. The British Admiral was engaged on something very nearly approaching an inshore cruise; it appears that he had discounted R.A.F. assistance; he was hoping for a continuance of cloudy weather. But perhaps the most significant fact of all is that, having been detected by the enemy's reconnoitring aircraft, he had actually abandoned the design and was on his way back to Singapore when overtaken by disaster. Such is the impression in the public mind, which otherwise refuses to grapple further with the problem, content to think that everything will be satisfactorily explained when the Board of Admiralty sends its post-war linen to the wash.

The clouds are dark and lowering in the Far East. It may be that they will descend still further before they are dispersed. A militant nation has sprung into the arena suddenly in that portion of the globe, possessing the inestimable advantage of being the Air Power on the spot. To wrest that sore advantage from him is a first preliminary to the eventual victory on which we count. Could not a bomber force be spared from home? It might mean a lessening of pressure on the Nazi war machine. But would that matter?

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

EBB AND FLOW—AN IRISH BOOK COMMENTARY

By Stephen Gwynn

IRELAND like every other neutral country offers a study in morbid psychology. In England where people accept many privations and at times even dangers, the average citizen is supported by pride; he or she likes to feel that "England can take it." In Ireland no such tonic is possible, though all minds are constantly preoccupied with the war and ordinary talk reveals a curiously complicated mentality. There are no doubt some who regard immunity from war's hardships as fruits of a victory gained twenty years ago, and these may be said to be proud of their neutrality. Yet in this war, which is not Ireland's war, numbers of Irishmen have volunteered unasked; they are reckoned at 150,000. One man, well placed to know, told me that the sons of all who served in the last struggle have joined up to a man; and their own families are proud of them. But the generation too old to serve remains, even where sympathy with England is strongest, well content to be exempt. Dublin has been gay this Christmas. Some indeed suggest hopefully that "Ireland may be in the war before it is over," which of course means that in their opinion Ireland may be attacked. For the present however they accept Mr. de Valera's policy with approval but without ardour. Ardour is not a state of mind which neutrality can easily produce. There are none of those strong public emotions which accompany war-time in countries that have taken a side; and as one consequence, the books which come out of Ireland this winter are noticeably short of enthusiasm. Oliver Gogarty, one of our best writers whether in prose or in verse, gives us no more than an elaborate piece of fooling in his *Going Native** which in this case means playing at being an Englishman. But nothing could be less like England of to-day than what is shown in this picture of elaborate and lengthy week-end parties. The opening chapters are in a different vein; they sketch Yeats in his old age, and though we need not seriously believe that the poet counselled his admirer to get out of Ireland because it had been given over to "rude civil servants," one may very well believe that the movement which Yeats led had ended in a state of things which he regarded without pride. As for Mr. Gogarty, he seems to have lost his illusions about Ireland and failed to acquire any enthusiasm for the English.

The Neutral Mentality

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Again Dublin has been vehemently discussing *A Lady's Child*† in which Miss Enid Starkey sketches a prominent Dublin family—(her own)—as she remembers it in the Edwardian period. The centre of that household was a famous Greek scholar, one of the greater gods in Trinity College before he became Commissioner for Education; but there is little trace in the book of the Irish literary movement

Dublin Society

* Cape. 8s. 6d.
† Faber & Faber. 8s. 6d.

then at its height. Neither Yeats nor Synge nor the Abbey theatre seems to have affected the consciousness of these highly cultivated Dubliners whom, in the opinion of contemporary Dublin, Miss Starkey has presented with devastating frankness. Showing them as they were in the Edwardian period, she could not show their reaction to wars which had not yet taken place; but the Land War lay behind them and apparently it had never touched their minds. In fact the book is a curious proof that intelligent persons can live through a revolution without being aware that it is taking place. The landlord period of Irish history was dead and buried and seemingly forgotten before Miss Starkey began to be educated; the later revolution which put an Irish government in place of Dublin Castle cannot have much disturbed the social life of this typical well-to-do and cultured family group, or there would be some allusion to it, if only by anticipation. Society in Dublin has been and still is cut off from political currents as the equivalent groups in London or in Edinburgh could never be. Broadly speaking, the earlier revolutionary struggle was one between landlord and tenant, and persons in Society, whether they owned land or not, counted themselves on the side of the landowner. The struggle was fought out between government with its soldiery, police and law-courts, on one side, and a combination of peasants and shopkeepers on the other, led by what Society called 'rascally agitators.' When the active period of that struggle ended and the landlords were bought out, what remained was the fight to destroy the power of the English government with which social respectability identified itself. Literature to some extent in Ireland took the side of nationalism and was therefore not unnaturally suspect; Miss Starkey and her family were more concerned with the literature and art that came to Ireland across the sea than what was home grown. Her story does not touch the later time when the second wave of revolution swept away the English government, as the first had swept away the landlords, "England's faithful garrison." But if she had to describe Dublin society of the same grouping to-day, she would show it equally unconcerned with local politics—into which members of Dublin society are not encouraged to adventure.

* * * * *

Rhyme and Rancour

There is however no lack of literature (using the word as it is used by propagandists) produced by those who accept the revolution with conscious delight. A typical example is *Rackrent Hall** by Mr. M. J. MacManus, literary editor of the *Irish Press*, the organ of Mr. de Valera's party. In a prefatory critical note he laments the "solemnity, tunelessness and obscurity" of much verse written to-day in Ireland conforming, as he says, to English models. Although as he puts it "Europe's sky is darkened by the wings of countless chickens coming home to roost," Ireland, he thinks, might produce "a swinging song of battle or a fierce resonant satire." But would Switzerland or Sweden or any other neutral country be a likely breeding ground for battle songs? You cannot have it both ways, nor cultivate at once martial music and a policy of judicious avoidance. And if fierce resonant satire began to deal with affairs at the moment, would the censor let it through? Mr. MacManus tries his hand at satire, but he goes back for subjects to an Ireland about which the censor need not trouble, and which he knows only by hearsay—the Ireland in which landlords had the power of eviction. I have the questionable advan

* Talbot Press, Dublin. 2s. 6d.

tage of having grown up in it and have known and worked with the men who broke the landlord power—which at its worst was pretty bad. The Lord Leitrim of whom Mr. MacManus writes lived in my father's parish, and I remember well the messenger coming in with the news of his killing. But Mr. MacManus gives us the picturesque detail that he had a great library. It seems certain that there was a three-day sale of books at Mulroy House; yet I wonder if that was not after the death of a quite different Lord Leitrim. All I know is that an emient Irish scholar thought seriously of going down because some works of special interest to him were included. Has Mr. MacManus any grounds for suggesting that the library contained a rare edition of Dante or a Crashaw or a Donne? However this is a side issue; what I want to point out is that Mr. MacManus and others like him who condemn Lover and Father Prout for "stage Irishism" run into stage Irishism of another kind. They give us the "stage landlord." This book has rhymes about a "Lady Louisa tall and fair," who first built a church for the Protestants and then

> To Father Thady she gave a chapel
> (Just like handing a child an apple)
> Complete with bells and a slated steeple
> That called to Mass all the country people.

But when famine came and the rents were not paid, Lady Louisa "sent out Peelers and crowbar brigade to pull down the rooftree and quench the hearth fire." Now this retrospective rancour which snarls even at the gift of a chapel affects me unpleasantly and makes me uncertain of the rhymer's good faith. I don't believe in such a combination of qualities. My recollections of Donegal include not only Lord Leitrim but Lord George Hill, a white-bearded old gentleman with the most courtly manners, dressed in homespuns from his Gweedore estate, which he had bought deliberately because the people were dreadfully poor. He and his household were the only gentlefolk I knew who learned Irish so that they might have more friendliness with their Irish-speaking tenants; it used to be said that if Lord George's horses went lame, the tenants would pull his phaeton home those ten long Irish miles any day. Yet when the Land War came, Gweedore was drawn into the general strike against rents. I am not certain whether there were evictions there, but there was bitterness, and there was ingratitude. However, Mr. MacManus would probably think that to collect rents at all was an outrage. He writes triumphantly

> Not all the King Harmans and all the King's men
> Will bring back the gentry to Connaught again.

Well, till the other day Lady Gregory, Edward Martyn and W. B. Yeats were gentry resident in Connaught, and I do not think Connaught the richer for their absence. Nor do I think that the country people anywhere had any desire to see the gentry disappear—which is a quite different matter from the disappearance of the landlord power.

Again I have much sympathy with Mr. MacManus in his wish for gayer and more tuneful poetry, but his review of what Ireland can show in the way of light verse is singularly inadequate. He has forgotten Alfred Graves and C. L. Graves; he probably never heard of A. D. Godley. But apparently he accounts as Irish only those who write and publish within the shores of Ireland. Yet even so he might have found consolation on his own publishers' premises. Lynn Doyle's *Lilts and Lyrics** are just as "easy and unpretentious" as Mr. MacManus claims that his own verses are, and without putting

it too high they are just as good. I am for several reasons attracted by the piece called "The Worker in the Fields"; it has good sententious lines, such as

> The lucky man is the man with the job worth doin' that does it with pride.

But better than this are lines that slash in a picture.

> The turnip ground grows purple black with the drivin' sleet . . . .
>
> The seeds fly far from my hand to nest in the readied ground . . . .
>
> The ripe wheatfield curves an' shines like a horse's Back . . . .

Both these writers of verse lament the recent untimely death of one of Ireland's major poets, F. R. Higgins. Mr. MacManus stresses the fact that he was buried in his own county of Meath, at Laracor where Swift's memory lingers. I am glad that he accepts at least one of the Anglo-Irish writers as not wholly alien, for, having much sympathy with his stand for "melody and rhythm," I regret to find him setting up a most narrowing definition of what should be accounted "kindly Irish of the Irish."

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The Irish Puzzle

Anybody who wishes to know how Ireland reached its present attitude—whether in Eire or in the Six Counties—cannot do better than study Mr. Donal O'Sullivan's book on *The Irish Free State and its Senate*.† It is a pleasure to find subjects of the most bitter controversy treated with human generosity. Mr. O'Sullivan is a prominent Irish scholar, but I have found no one who speaks with more commonsense on the attempt to make Ireland into a Gaelic speaking country, or on the view that Irish nationality needs a separate language to distinguish it. As one of the official clerks to the Senate during its fifteen years of existence, he recognized the good-will of the Unionist minority towards the new Ireland. The Senate was indeed an attempt to make available for national purposes elements in the nation which the methods of elective democracy would have failed to bring in. Mr. O'Sullivan completes his work by a review of the last years in which Eire has been governed mainly on the single Chamber system. Inevitably he closes on a note of interrogation, seeing his country well within the area of a conflict "from the results of which Ireland cannot remain immune, and of which no man can yet see the end."

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* Talbot Press. 2s. 6d.
† Faber & Faber. 25s.

GREY EMINENCE, by Aldous Huxley. *Chatto and Windus.* 15*s.*
TRAINING FOR THE LIFE OF THE SPIRIT, by Gerald Heard. *Cassell.* 1*s.* 6*d.*

Mr. Huxley's essay in biography is perhaps the most remarkable of his many books, and one of the most remarkable books of this decade. It seems to me to be no exaggeration to say that Mr. Huxley is our leading political philosopher. This book is a psychological study of a Capuchin friar who was also a 'power politician,' a mystic who was also in effect foreign secretary of France and founder of the French Navy, a man who strove to serve at once God and the Cardinal, at once a Savonarola and a Metternich, Père Joseph du Tremblay, the 'Grey Eminence' who was *alter ego* of the Red Eminence, Armand de Richelieu. The book is full of admirable asides, as in the analysis of Milton, and of much typical Huxleiana, but it is also filled with a driving indignation and occupied with a precise vivisection.

Aldous Huxley has his own *Eminence Gris*, who has succeeded D. H. Lawrence in this post. It is Mr. Gerald Heard. *Grey Eminence* and *Training for the Life of the Spirit* should be read together. Heard's research shows in Huxley's study; Huxley's quotations reappear in Heard's brief manual. The two between them, fortified by great erudition and by genuine concern and sensitivity, are establishing a school of mystical religion and of the communal life of which I expect great things. Heard provides, in book after book, the positive message. Mr. Huxley in his more recent work, *Beyond Mexique Bay, After Many Summers* and the present book, provides a Swiftian critique of our present civilization, its vogues and pseudo-heroes. He shows where these deviate to their own damnation from the Grand Tradition of righteous living handed down from Augustine and earlier. He damns them from the mouths of the saints and from the writings of the psychologists. Here the mischievous policy is relentlessly exposed of one of 'the founders of modern times,' the supreme 'power politician,' Richelieu, and also the devil's work of dividing Europe in order that France might unite herself, making Protestants the pawns of a secularized Cardinal in civil wars blasphemously called 'the Wars of Religion' and literally promoting cannibalism. The downfall of Richelieu's colleague, and the corruption of a saint by nationalist bigotry, is shown in the chapter on the virus of power called 'Nothing Fails like Success.' The Lord Buddha, by contrast, Mr. Huxley implies, was not interested in politics—not even as much as is Mr. Gandhi.

I have the temerity to say here that the mystic path, as traditionally followed, seems to me a raised path running beside the catholic and human highway. It is not a sidetrack. It is, however, only satisfactory when it is taken as *one* way, followed by men of a special function. Mr. Huxley unwittingly provides my reasons. They are, certainly, not that mysticism has only appealed to a few. So have the higher mathematics. They are not the Marxist argument that mysticism is "an escape." Achievement of a 'deeper reality' cannot be an escape, if indeed such reality is real. They are Huxley's own argument that philosophical questions are meaningless unless there are operational methods for their solution. Père Joseph did not solve this problem of living as, let us say, Confucius did. It is possible to be a considerable mystic, in love with God, and an evil man—that is what

emerges from this book. What one does become is a fanatic . . . A fanatic may be a great power, as Hitler is a great power and as is the Communist party. This does not remove the consideration that fanaticism is a moral deformity. Nor does great personal heroism cover the canvas or cover over this deformity. It mitigates the fault, but does not solve the issue. Where, among the mystics, a Père Joseph failed, there but for the grace of God might any other man. The mystic route does not seem to be the safeguard or to have the self-sufficiency that Mr. Heard supposes.

I will not go as far as Croce in saying that the transitory is the stuff of life or that the historic issues of here and now set the sole genuine problems of philosophy. But I will say that every problem of life fully solved must be solved becomingly—'elegantly'—and that the Quest of the Infinite only provides solutions at one level, although perhaps at the highest, that of the detached teacher, the total pacifist, the Buddha, to whom it matters not one straw what tyrant or commissar, Cæsar or Nero may reign, such being ordained of God. There are also problems of Power and Original Sin, Justice and the Secular Sword, which are also genuine problems; which can be solved elegantly; and which Père Joseph, the power politician (and all politicians whatsoever are power politicians, since politics are the relations of human power) happened to solve inelegantly. It is the grandeur of the Catholic Church that it has always tried to solve both orders of problem. Like the Pharaohs, it has held the crook and the flail—the crozier above the sword. Mr. Huxley's book is an attempt to argue the impropriety of this and his argument must conclude in Tolstoian anarchism. The State exists by the Old Covenant—but the State, which is not mystical, exists, and rightly exists. It is the multiplicity of States, which Père Joseph did so much to confirm while uniting France, which wrongly exists. In the phrase of Dante: *Maxime unum est maxime bonum.* What was wrong with Père Joseph was not that he was a politician, or even a politician using force, but that, in the last resort, he was a bad politician *sub specie humanitatis*, even although he unified France.

There will, however be few readers of Mr. Huxley's curious and fascinating book who will not ask themselves, after reading it, whether most of our power politicians are not bad politicians or who will not find the question, although bitter in the mouth, salutary in the belly.

GEORGE CATLIN.

THE POWER BEHIND THE MICROPHONE, by P. P. Eckersley. *Cape.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

Mr. Eckersley's book is written with authority, because of his long and intimate connection with the B.B.C. as its Chief Engineer, and comes with the more authority, one feels, because of his wide general knowledge of the technical side of broadcasting. After all, broadcasting begins with the allocation of wireless wave-lengths; the scarcity of these was, as the writer very properly observes, first responsible for the monopoly enjoyed by the B.B.C., and against this monopoly, and its results, most of his criticisms are directed. This criticism is never merely destructive; indeed, few books on broadcasting have embodied so many positive and sensible ideas. Neither his likes nor his dislikes are confined to small points; he does not wish broadcasting to give more of this, or less of that;

he wants, rather, certain very radical reforms, and some completely new arrangements. His views are backed by his own very wide experience of broadcasting, both monopolistic and competitive, and as a critic he is positive, and, indeed, exuberant in explaining his ideas.

> Mr. Eckersley's complaint is that the B.B.C. should have concentrated upon a cultural interpretation of its duties, instead of, as it has done, upon a policy which is subservient to the spirit of bureaucratic compromise which fathered it.

It has, in fact, not been "as independent in spirit as it was financially." Instead of being a "patron of the arts," it has patronized the artist. Mr. Eckersley is right, one feels, in tilting against the continual attitude of compromise brought about by the B.B.C's. peculiar semi-controlled position, and against the complacency and smugness often shown by the Corporation. He feels that those most responsible for the conduct of affairs, are not sufficiently alive and creative; they are pre-occupied by administration, and they will not give latitude enough to the original or clever worker. Some of his criticisms of programmes are unfair; he lashes scornfully the Children's Hour, Schools' Broadcasting, and the Talks department, but seems to be upbraiding these features as they were, say, some years ago, and not as they are to-day. But in saying that poor programmes and unimaginative arrangement may largely be the result of safe monopoly, with no spur of competition, he is very near the truth.

His remedies are various. First, he was never satisfied with the use made of the Regional scheme, and would like the B.B.C., if it ever has Regions again after the war, to allow them almost complete freedom in putting on their own programmes, instead of largely, as be-

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fore the war, acting as a "double outlet" for material from headquarters. If the National were used for news, official announcements, and all sorts of short, necessary items, the Regions would be able to afford long periods of really good and independent stuff. His extension of this plan for uninterrupted programmes of good quality work to suit different tastes (classical music, light music, serious drama, frivolous features, and so on), is the most revolutionary of his ideas. "Wired wireless" would be substituted for the present broadcasting system; on a network of cables, a large number of programmes could be broadcast, and listeners would enjoy perfect reception. Instead of a "hotch-potch," they would get a steady flow of anything they wanted, to be turned on at will. If this system had been adopted before the war, we should never have been reduced to two programmes with bad or indifferent reception, for there would have been no "wireless waves" for enemy aircraft to pick up. Further, Mr. Eckersley would allow some commercial companies to broadcast also; the "wired wireless" system could carry these as well, and the stimulus would be good for the B.B.C. It is certainly amusing to think of the B.B.C. having to keep a careful eye on competitors, lest the listening public desert to the enemy, as it used to desert to "Radio Normandie" on Sundays. Vested interests, Mr. Eckersley says, have naturally opposed the prospects both of "wired wireless" and of commercial broadcasting; but if both these could be established, he thinks we should gain much in enjoyment and in "education" in the real sense. Whether the "mechanization" of entertainment, the feeding of the ears of the populace, has not already gone far enough, he does not consider. Under his scheme, there would be still greater quantities of ready-made entertainment pouring from the tap. Perhaps his view is that, since "radio" has come to stay, it should be as copious and as good as possible. He is certainly sincere in wanting to improve what is good already, and to remove imperfections; his book is lively, and his criticism valuable.

MARY CROZIER.

CHARTIST PORTRAITS, by G. D. H. Cole. *Macmillan.* 15*s.*

LORD LIVERPOOL AND LIBERAL TORYISM, 1820-1827, by W. R. Brock. *Cambridge University Press.* 8*s.* 6*d.*

Mr. Cole's approach to the history of the 19th century is well known; a deep sympathy with the struggle of the working classes against "a hard generation, with the hardness of men utterly convinced of their own rightness, and of being on the side of economic progress"; a clear insight into the causes of their early failures and a strong belief in the gradual growth of the Labour Movement from the Industrial Revolution. Mr. Brock has other interests. His concern is with government and in this, his first book, he gives little indication that he cares one jot for the effect of government on the lives of the people. Although dealing with different decades of the same century the two books can profitably be read together.

Of the two Mr. Cole's book, a work of mature judgment, is naturally the more valuable. It is his object "to present something like a general picture of the rise and fall of the (Chartist) movement and of the widely differing elements that made it up." He achieves this by his choice of portraits demonstrating the appeal of Chartism to men

of vastly different character and attainments.

As Mr. Cole says, three forces were the mainspring of Chartism—"the factory reform movement, the ruthless campaign waged by employers, with Government backing, against the Trade Unions, and the New Poor Law." In fact the People's Charter contained nothing that was new. Nevertheless William Lovett, with his friends of the London Working Men's Association, redrafted the demands and aspirations of the common people at a vital time and for thousands the Charter became the symbol of liberty and justice.

The Charter's advocates divided not without bitterness over the use of physical force. Those who preached moral force were right in their assumption that threats were useless without weapons to implement them. But the cleavage was really much deeper than a question of arms between those who believed that a rational movement should use rational methods and those who agreed with Feargus O'Connor and those who went further than he did that such talk was moral 'humbug.' O'Connor himself proved, when the Monster Petition went to Parliament in three cabs, that the Government were not afraid of signatures; what the Government were afraid of was the mob.

Chartism was born to fail. At its worst it was reactionary; at its best it was the great awakening movement for those who were not yet ready to seize political power. For this reason it will always be a vital page of our history while the lives of those who gave their all to the Charter will continue to inspire. The Chartist Movement numbered many of the foolish in its ranks and foolishness was not the least characteristic of several of its leaders. Yet of how many can it be said that there was nothing to admire? Even O'Connor with his mad Land Plan and his atrocious egotism, sacrificed his fortune and how great was John Fielden in human virtues or Ernest Jones in his almost senseless sacrifices for a lost cause?

Mr. Brock finds no difficulty in defending the repressive Six Acts of 1819 describing them as "measures which, with all their faults, were successful." By successful he means that in his opinion the country was thereby saved from revolution, an opinion shared undoubtedly by many of Liverpool's Government. But perhaps Mr. Brock is right to show in rather better light a Prime Minister who had charge of this country for no less than 15 years.

Historians have not dealt very kindly with Lord Liverpool, considering him a colourless personality

The men from JAVA

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These men are not Javanese; they live in the South of France—but not the leisured pre-war South of France. Their home is a mining camp in the small Mediterranean town of Vaugelas. Their quarrels, their amours, their nostalgia provide M. Jean Malaquais with a wealth of material for his racy, intensely modern first novel, which won the Prix Renaudot.

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compared with his great foreign ministers Castlereagh and Canning, or with Huskisson at the Board of Trade and young Peel at the Home Office. Mr. Brock, however, claims considerable credit for Liverpool in selecting and backing the right political horse and in a negative way it does appear from Mr. Brock's narrative that the Prime Minister was held in good esteem by his peers.

Nevertheless, in an admittedly ticklish period, events controlled Liverpool rather than he the events. He remained to the end a singularly unlightened man for one who, as a young man, had been present at the storming of the Bastille. Fear of the mob played a dominant part in early 19th century politics and Liverpool was not the man to see beyond it.

JOHN ARMITAGE.

THE MODERN SHORT STORY, by H. E. Bates. *Nelson. 7s. 6d.*

The short story has been for some time now in a very precarious position. Threatened on the one hand by the plain fact that, on the whole, the public does not like it, and on the other by a literary reaction against the Tchechovian form which Mr. Bates has himself perfected; and now, like poetry, almost crushed out of existence by the paper shortage, its future would seem at least doubtful. Yet, as Mr. Bates points out, a kind of short-story Renaissance is in progress. Writers are groping for new directions, because

> the new war inevitably walls off, as it were, the old era. The story of tranquil, reflective surface, in which the currents of emotions move out of sight, belongs to that era primarily . . . but the new era of terror and dislocation will—and is bound to—demand a change of form.

No writer as yet, has discovered that form; and the problem of its eventual nature is by far the most important one raised by this book.

Beginning with the origins of the modern short story in Gogol and Poe, Mr. Bates traces its development to the present day. The form took root in America, France and Russia rather than in England during the nineteenth century; mainly, as is made clear, because of the dangerous tendency of English prose writing towards diffuseness—to *describe* rather than to *create*. The short story must, like a poem, be sufficient in itself; it must be an emotional situation, not the blue print of one. It took nearly a hundred years for any European writer fully to grasp this essential fact; hence the sudden, almost unexpected flowering of the short story since Tchechov. He and Maupassant are accepted by Mr. Bates as the great masters; and the chapter on these two very different writers is one of the best in the book. After the turn of the century, the English story for the first time gained an importance and a distinctive style of its own, with the advent of Kipling and Wells; and later, of Katherine Mansfield and A. E. Coppard. Although admitting his importance as the first English writer to take the short story seriously, Mr. Bates' section on Kipling is little more than a passionate attack against a writer whose personality and work he obviously loathes (". . . . a writer whose outlook is one of harsh, confused, egotistical mysticism; a voice vulgar and cruel in its class intolerance"). Little attempt is made to prove this thesis, it is merely stated; and the result is not criticism, but abuse.

Throughout the early twenties of this century, a real renaissance of

the short story was taking place in America, its chief figures Sherwood Anderson and Hemingway. The effect of that movement has only comparatively recently reached England, and its results are hard to predict; but there is no doubt that we have a renaissance of our own, led mainly by such young Welsh writers as Dylan Thomas (whose story *The Tree* is one of the best in English) and Alun Lewis, author of the beautiful *The Wanderers*. Mr. Bates is wary of predicting what course the English story may take:

> if the story of the last twenty years has been close to the lyric, the story of the next twenty years may move, or be forced to move, towards dramatic poetry

is all he will venture. But he has no doubt at all that the form is a living one, and that it has reached a crossroad rather than a dead end. His book is important because it gives evidence for such optimism; though it is sometimes spoilt by personal prejudice, and gives up too much space to painstaking analysis of single writers. And I, for one, wish Mr. Bates had overcome his modesty and applied the same process to his own work; without it, the chapters on contemporary writing have almost the vacancy of a princeless *Hamlet*.

SIDNEY KEYES.

HOW STRONG IS AMERICA?, by Noel Barber. *Harrap.* 6*s.*

AMERICA IN WORLD AFFAIRS, by Allan Nevins. *Oxford University Press.* 2*s.* 6*d.*

POLITICS AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, by D. W. Brogan. *Cambridge University Press.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

"Unforeseen events," as the advertisements of an American insurance company tirelessly assert, "change the shape of men's affairs." The surprising thing, though, is how often they don't. Here are three books, all written before America's entry into the war, whose value is virtually unimpaired by that fact. In Mr. Barber's case, admittedly, credit must go to him for intelligent anticipation; "Who knows what may have happened," he asks when discussing Lend-Lease, "in the very brief time between the completion and publication of this book?" But Professors Brogan and Nevins, who are dealing rather with what is behind the hand that fires the gun, with foreign policy and domestic politics, retain their value because what the British public need to know about America is the fundamental principles of her behaviour just as much as—if not more than—the latest detailed information.

Similarly the worth of these little

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books is to be judged primarily not by the correctness of their detail so much as by the truth of their main picture. If that were not so one might cavil at Professor Nevins' description of the Springfield *Republican* as an "internationalist" newspaper or at his implication that there are only two Assistant-Secretaries at the State Department, and Mr. Barber could be taken to task for calling Mr. Rosenman a "judge of the Supreme Court," or for omitting to tell us that Mr. Stimson had been Secretary of State. But it is not by these motes that such sunbeams are to be measured; the test is a simpler one—do they make the dark places plain?

Mr. Barber emphatically does. He tells you what he's looking for, how he's found it and then in plain, clear words and diagrams what the answer is. Even the labyrinth of the U.S. defence organization, in which strong men have been known to lose their way, gets at any rate its principal outlines delineated in black and white for all to see. He disentangles appropriations from payments and orders from deliveries and if he doesn't know a defence figure he doesn't try to bluff it out. In Mr. Barber's statistics of 'planes and guns and tanks there are no numbers 'accruing,' in muddling-through phrase. You may differ from some of Mr. Barber's judgments—for example that the delay in using automobile plants for aeroplane production was due entirely to the practical difficulties of the switch-over—but you must admire a useful, clear, comprehensive piece of reporting, behind whose readability clearly lies a lot of hard work by author and assistants.

Professor Nevins has a harder task, to win the English common reader to both respect and understanding of American foreign policy. He brings to it, besides his equipment as a scholar, an engaging willingness to admit what he feels to be his country's mistakes, and a clarifying frankness about the course he wants U.S. policy to pursue. An ardent internationalist, he yet speaks fairly for his isolationist fellow-countrymen, but he has his own interpretation of American policy, which sets the key in which his book is written:

> The cardinal tradition or principle of the United States in ordering its foreign relations has been its predilection for the promotion of democracy throughout the world.

In what must be one of the best 'Current Problems' books, Professor Brogan analyses the structure of American politics, with particular attention to that element of rigidity which the legalistic basis of the constitution imparts to the whole machine. It is a rigidity which has more than once operated powerfully on America's conduct of her foreign relations, but Professor Brogan's concern is wider—parties, President, Congress, the Supreme Court all pass under his penetrating glance. The book, as he says "only illustrates its theme," without exhausting it. But it illustrates it with a learning, wit and wisdom that ought to attract every student of American affairs.

H. G. NICHOLAS.

ENGLISH CUSTOM AND USAGE, by Christina Hole. *Batsford.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

ENGLISH NIGHT LIFE, by Thomas Burke. *Batsford.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

Singularly appropriate is the publication of Miss Christina Hole's book at a time when, for reasons of security and rationing of food and clothing, many of the customs chronicled in it may have to be suspended 'for the duration.' It is excellently written, comprehensive in its survey and generous even by

peace-time standards in its illustrations—a welcome addition to the records of our national heritage. The author starts modestly with a wide acknowledgment of the help she has received from many quarters and quietly passes on to her own researches, the extent of which would seem to justify more detailed treatment.

The book is divided into thirteen chapters commencing with pagan custom survivals whose origins are lost in the mists of time and finishes with the many quaint gifts and bequests, descriptions of the distribution of which even now hold their place in the news items of our daily papers. It is not surprising that in the grim struggle for existence in primitive times special homage was paid to the gods in respect of such elemental forces as reproduction and fertility of crops. (One notes the discernment of later authorities in incorporating such festivals with the Christian calendar; crowded churches on Harvest Sunday are at least explained in part). Country folk will enjoy the accounts of their own fêtes and dances and for most town dwellers the book will be a revelation. Visitors to London and particularly Americans who have coveted the quill pen in the hand of the bust of John Stow will find the story refurbished here. The race for the Doggett's coat and badge, the King's swan-uppers in bright striped jerseys on their journey up-stream (I once heard a Londoner dismiss this in a gem of understatement as "a bargemen's outing no doubt")—these and many other customs quite as odd and enchanting find their place in these pages. In the wearisome uniformity of these days this book comes as a refreshing challenge that we who are the inheritors of such traditions should not let them pass out of our national life through our preoccupation or indifference.

Country air and exercise instead of a stuffy office and crowded 'buses . . .

She's one of the people who may no longer need

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It is a book to suit all ages and its value is enhanced by the bibliography and index at its close.

Mr. Thomas Burke outlines the scope of the second volume with his subtitle: *From Norman Curfew to Present Black-out*, and with his customary diligence and attention to detail indicates the salient features of his subject. The emphasis on drinking, eating and gambling will I imagine provoke two reactions from his readers—regret that the good old days are gone beyond return and condemnation for such "goings-on." Mr. Burke anticipates this second attitude in his preface when he remarks:

> Both authors and artists of any particular period are apt to find their material in the more ebullient expressions of life. Quiet people going about their occasions do not afford very fruitful material for either pen or pencil.

He has cast his net wide and brought up for our interest and information much entertaining material. His stories are reinforced by a wealth of contemporary quotations and the book is raised above the ordinary by its prints and illustrations. These are quite outstanding and the photographs in the last section remind us of lights we hope soon to see again and of Tube shelterers we hope never to see again. I doubt if this volume will rank among the greatest of Mr. Burke's work chiefly because the limitations of the subject make for tedium which not even his descriptive powers can entirely overcome. The picture jacket would appear to be one of Messrs. Batsfords' best. It will be a duller day if ever paper restrictions put a veto on these.

HERBERT BANYARD.

CORRESPONDENCE

SOME REFLECTIONS ON CRIME IN WAR-TIME

To the Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY.

Sir,

May I make two corrections to my article which you published in the January issue?

(*a*) On page 38, line 12 of the second paragraph, the word "reports" should really be experiences. I was not referring to reports, that is, written statements, but to criminological experiences of a general character, scientific generalizations based upon a number of observations of actual facts. In the subsequent sentences several such general experiences are quoted by way of illustration.

(*b*) The last sentence of the second paragraph on page 45 should read:

> It would seem essential, however, that the future development of the whole crime situation should be closely watched and that statistical material should be collected which might render possible among other points, a more accurate estimate of how much of wartime crime is due to the activities of a small group of recidivists or to great masses of newcomers respectively.

I should be very grateful if you would be kind enough to publish this letter in your February number.

Yours faithfully,

HERMANN MANNHEIM.

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